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THE GAME

Okay, so the last game was too hard. Nobody did it. I think we've proved our point.
This time, the questions are simple identifications. Of course, you'll have to read your
Dialogue and maybe do a bit more research, but you should be able to get it.
Entries are due by March 20, and will be judged by the following Monday. The first two .
winning entries will earn their executors the usual fabulous prizes.
Good luck.

IDENTIFY:
1 ) Six philosophers pictured in Dialogue. Give their full
names, birth and death dates, and the names of the philosophical movements they founded or participated in.
2 ) The symbol of the medical profession pictured in Dialogue.
What is its origin, and what does it stand for?
3 ) A piece of good news in "What You Will." When did it
happen?

4 ) An analogy between reading Shakespeare and reading
philosophy. What work is quoted and what is the reader's
approach?

5 ) The man who made prints of fifty-three stages. Of what
were they? What is #48 a print of?
6) "The mouth." Where was her son assaulted? How does she
differ from her neighbors?
7 ) Principle which gained a theory because of the dissolution
.of a republic .. What was the name of the republic? What was also
essential for the acceptance of the principle?
8 ) The two views of the essential nature of humanity in two different articles. How do they differ?
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What You Will
To Aspire and Perspire

A historian (whose courageous
wedding with a philosopher is currently
being interpreted as an extreme attempt
to implement the Hegelian dialectic to
produce a flesh and blood synthesis of
antithetical principles) writes us this
jaundiced sidelight to the eternal battle
between Diachronic and Synchronic.
As a jogger but not a runner, and a
hiker in mountains but not a rock
climbing mountaineer (until recently I
· thought K2 referred only to a very early
work of ·Mozart), I have found myself
something of an outsider in the two departments at Calvin to which I am
·closest, history and philosophy. In recent .
years it has become notorious that if one
wants full acceptance in one of these departments, one must adopt with cultic
fervor the respective departmental sport.
Philosophers, particularly of the analytic
ilk, are usually rock climbers. Historians
tend to be long-distance runners.
The connections between disciplines
and sports are by no means accidental.
Indeed, the same traits are necessary for
success in both the discipline and its
special sport. Rock climbing, true to
modern analytic philosophy, involves
discreet and limited problems that go
nowhere. Occasionally rock climbers will
climb real mountains, · but largely with
the purpose of attacking the problems of
spectacularly high rock climbs. As to
reaching the summit of the mountain
itself, their only justification is "because
it's there." This is, of course, the wellknown ploy of justifying what one has no
reason for by calling it a "basic belief,"
and hence making it as philosophically
legitimate as belief in God.
Pure rock climbing is, however, the
apogee of the discipline. In pure rock
climbing, as in pure analytic philosophy,
the goal is to resolve an artificially set
problem. The outcome involves no
ambiguity. Either you solve the problem
or you do not; either you make the climb,
· or you fall off. The time involved is of no
importance. Elaborate . technical
equipment and specialized training are
required. No novice will be able to follow
an expert's lead up the more difficult
climbs.
Historians, by contrast, are much
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more ordinary, and so is their sport. It is
traightforward and commonsensical.
No technical equipment or ,t raining is
essential. Amateurs readily follow
courses set by experts. Most non-participants consider the activity boring; but
practitioners see the fault lying with tl!_e
non-participants. Rather than attacking
set problems, historians impose their
own structures on their material, determining its beginning, middle, and end.
The time involved is a very important
consideration. Unlike the philosophers,
historians cover a great deal of territory,
though perhaps rather superficially.
Here, however, the differences end.
Historian/ runners, like philosopher/
rock climbers, do not go anywhere. Almost always they end up where they
began.
Historians, who like to model themselves on someone in the past, aspire to
imitate the first marathon runner,
Pheidippides. Pheidippides was an early
Greek historian who in 490 B.C. ran
twenty-six miles to Athens to deliver a
lecture on the defeat of the Persians ·at
Marathon. Pheidippides died before the
lecture was finished. No matter. Modern
historian/ runners are always hoping to
brighten the day of their audiences with a
bit of good news-for instance, that the
Thirty Years War is definitely over.
The most alarming trait of modern
historian/ runners, however, is that

although they almost always try to tell
the truth about the past (they win not intentionally lie about their running times),
they seldom tell the full truth about the
present and the future. As runners, they
invariably will regale each other before a
race with stories of how miserable their
condition is, how they are not over their
cold, how they are tired from the night
before, how their knees hurt, and how
they do not expect to run very fast at all.
In fact, they feel fine and will likely set a
personal record. So also, as historians-,

although they will not intentionally
falsify the past, and may even look for
some bright spots in it, they will be
irrepressibly pessimistic about the future.
The Thirty Years War may be over; but
a historian will be unable to restrain him. self from adding that something worse is
on its way.
Legend has it, in fact, that
Pheidippides was prepared to deliver a
discourse on how everything after the
victory was bound to be a letdown. Fortunately for the Athenians, Pheidippides
proved to be less long-winded than most
historians. Otherwise, they might have
been so demoralized that there would
have been no Golden Age, no Greek
philosophy, and, hence, perhaps, no rock
climbing.
Heartfelt Reflections .

Rhonda Bruxvoort, a junior Sociology
major at Calvin, sent us these thoughts
about her recent interim as an Outreach
Worker.
Sometimes I pretend to myself that my
interest and involvement with the
deteriorated downtown area of Grand
Rapids over the past two years is due
solely to my humanitarian concern, my
Christian love, and all sorts of other
noble and self-sacrificing reasons. But
when I'm honest, I admit that Heartside,
a downtown neighborhood, is simply intriguing. The most interesting facet of
this neighborhood is the people. I have
· made the absolutely amazing discovery
that beyond all the complex social problems which are concentrated in this area,
there are real people; people as varied
and complex as shells on the seashore.
For a predictable sort of Dutch person,
interacting with my friends on Division
Avenue has been a unique stimulant and
a whole lot of fun.
This interim, for an independent study
under Calvin's Sociology Department, I
worked as an Outreach Worker for the
Heartside Neighborhood Association.
The Association works to help Heartside deal with special issues and problems, many of them unique to that neighborhood. My job in that organization
was to promote a Food-Cooperative they
were starting, and to get people involved
in it. I did this primarily by contacting

people in their apartments or rooms
during the day. I found knocking on
doors in strange places an uneasy
prospect. Yet, this became my introduction to the people of Heartside, and I
became involved, at least in a . limited
way, in their lives.
Often; as I pounded the pavement of
Heartside, I wondered what sort of
person lives in a neighborhood like this?
And how do they live in this situation?
The answers I found were as different as
the people I met and as varied as thefr
situations.
I spent one afternoon in the Carlton
Hotel on South Division. The Carlton
used to be a nice place to stay when
Grand Rapids' city center was the center
of business and culture. Today the
Carlton is a shabby hotel, primarily
inhabited by single men, many of them in
their twenties and thirties. It was ·one of
the most oppressive places I have been in:
a grayish sort of place with narrnw hallways, odd little stairways, and windows
tucked away in inconspicuous places. It
reminded me of a setting for a drug bust
in a TV cop show. Every time I walked up
. to a new stairway or entered a new hallway, I 1lo.oked for exits and planned my
escape route. After a couple of hours
talking with people, i felt as if the walls
were closing in and would swallow me
whole.
it is difficult to describe the typical
Carlton resident because having met
some of them I can think of exceptions to
•all the rules. Many live at the Carlton out
of economic necessity. They don't have
family resources to draw upon and their ·
personal resources are meager. The
Carlton is the home of unstable people
and people for whom the street is a way
of life. My impression is that alcohol
flows freely and ·illegal drugs are readily
· accessible. Not all the residents are unemployed, however. Some have full-time
jobs or use the hotel as a location from
which to look for part-time work or day
labor. Nor are all the residents crimin~ls
or even engaged in criminal activity. I
met one eighty-year-old man who could
afford to live elsewhere, but who lives at
the Carlton because he finds it interesting to observe the sithations arid the
people there. His next-door neighbor, a
man who desperately wants to move out,
can sing hymns as well as a·nyone in my
home church.
I enjoyed walking into the lobby of the
Carlton. I would usually see some people
I knew just hanging about. They were
curious about me. Once they found out
that I wasn't a case worker they warmed
up to me and were friendly and helpful.
They showed me around, gave me their

opinion on where I should put my signs
for the co-op, and warned me that "this
was no place for a woman." I listened to
complaints about thievery in the
building, complaints about the landlord,
and about the general moral character of
some of the other inhabitants. I began to
feel what it's like to live in a situation ·
where you ·can't trust anyone; living with
the fear that one of your neighbors might
steal from your room when you're out or
harm you when drunk. I also wondered
how I would change if I lived in the
Carlton Hotel.

Another building which intrigued me
was an apartment house at 303 1/2
Division Avenue. Given the address, try
to imagine what sort of tenants live there.
No, they weren't alcoholics, drug pushers .
or sluts. The residents · of 303 1/2
Division are mostly nice old ladies: the
grandmother type. Their building is not
very secure. The door to the street is not
locked during the day and the locks on
the doors are not especially good. How
do these ladies get by in that neighborhood, only about a block away from the
notorious Glass Bar, the principle source
of violence and street crime in the area? ·
I think that part of the answer lies in
the fact that these ladies know each other
and each other's business. When I walked
up the stairs into 303 1/2 I would usuallymeet the same little lady, putzing around
in the lai:ge entryway, sweeping or
changing light bulbs. Even if she wasn't in
the hallway, her room was the first one at
the top of the stairs, and she often left her
main door open behind a locked screen
door. I think it would take a lot of
ingenuity to get into 303 1/2 without this
.lady knowing it
The first time I came, I told her I was
bringing information about a food co-op.
She said she wasn't interested because her
son takes her shopping, but there was a
lady who lived down the hall who could
probably use something like that. After
I'd shouted awhile with that particular
old lady about the conveniences of the
Heartside Food Co-op, I went upstairs
and bumped into another lady who was
just leaving to get her hair done . . She
asked me what Heartside could do about
their landl_ord and directed rile to another

old lady who might be interested in the
Food Co-op. She checked her neighbor's
door and somehow knew that she was out
of bed. "You might have to spend some
time explaining it to her," she advised me,
"She's kind of deaf and has a hard time
understanding things." The ninety-yearold lady I met inside the apartment was
not nearly so dul1 as the impression I had
gotten of her from her neighbor. She
described to me what several of the residents had been doing that morning and
chatted with me about Senior Neighbors
and how her neighbors helped her get her
groceries. She showed me her apartment:
four small, but well heated rooms for
which she pays one hundred and fifteen
dollars a month. She has lived in that
building for fifteen· years. Later I learned
that several of the residents had lived at
303 1/2 for ten to fifteen years. I am still
amazed when I think of that defenseless
little old lady living fairly comfortably at
303 1/2 Division. But it is possible for her
l?ecause she has something the young
men at the Carlton do not have: good
neighbors.
Finally, one of ·the most interesting
people I met was a lady named Ruth, who
refers to herself as "the mouth." Ruth
lives in an apartment a few blocks up
from Division Avenue with her two sorts.
She is an atypical Heartsider. Most
Heartsicie dwellers don't get involved
with each other or with neighborhood
concerns. Ruth is involved with the
Neighborhood Association, not only
l;>ecause she enjoys the interaction, but
also because she sees that people in the
Heartside Neighborhood need to help
each other to make the neighborhood a
pleasant and safe place to live. She would
· like to see people in the area trading skills
and services and stepping out to help
each other. Ruth is proud of Heartside
a:Qd thinks it's a, good place to live. She
tries to convince her friends at work that
Heartside would be a more convenient
home for them. "When my friends ask me
why I live in such a high crime area," ·she
remarked, "I'm proud to say that the only ·
time my son was assaulted was in East
Grand Rapids, not in Heartside."
The men at the Carlton, the ladies at
303 .1/2 Division, and Ruth represent
three very different ways of living in
Heartside. I could talk for hours describing my friends in Heartside, each of
whom brings a different life history, a
different outlook on life, different
personal resources, and different
adaptations to life in that neighborhood.
The exciting thing about my interim was
meeting these people within their own
environment. Heartside has both given
and taught me much.
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No reasonahle unexceptionahle conclusion from a moral
standpoint is possihle in some such instances. though to fail to
seek for such is irresponsihle.
James Gustafwn
The Contributions of _Theology to Medical Ethics

Camille, in Dumas' work by that name, remarks, "When
God said that lying was a sin, he made an exception for doctors,
and he gave them permission to lie as many times a day as they
saw patients." In the late twentieth century, however, concealing the truth is not so readily excused, and patients increasingly
demand to be told the truth about their diagnosis and included
in decisions regarding treatment. In law this has given rise to
formal informed consent policies. This article is a discussion of
the bases and implications of truth-telling and informed
consent and is limited to considering competent adults in a
clinical, therapeutic setting.
The doctrine of informed consent is a relative new-comer to
the field of medical ethics. Although man's responsibility to
reveal the truth has been debated by philosophers since Plato's
Republic, truth as the physician's duty toward the patient was
historically given second priority to the Hippocratic injunction
to do no harm. Information concerning the patient's condition,
especially if the condition were serious, was presumed to be
deleterious to the healing process, and the patient was expected
to completely trust the doctor's judgment. If the physician felt
that the patient's condition should be revealed, he usually confided in the patient's family or close friends.
.
The status of truth-telling in the physician-patient relationship remained virtually unchanged for the next twenty-four
hundred years. The medieval physician Henri de Mondeville
suggested the following guide to his colleagues: "He ought to
promise a cure to every patient, but he should tell the parents or
the friends if there is any danger. ... Patients, on the other hand,
should trust their surgeons implicitly in everything appertaining
to their cure." 1 This sentiment was echoed five hundred years
later by the American Medical Association in their first code of
ethics.
While the medical establishment was reluctant to fully inform
their patients, twentieth-century medicine was escalating in
power and diversity at a mind-boggling rate. The preceding
century left medicine with the powerful tools of chemotherapy,
radiation and advanced surgical techniques. But riding on the
coattails of this new found power to increase and maintain
man's health was a greater capacity for harm and a host of
ethical dilemmas. With the ability to alter harmful genes has
come the risk of inducing harmful or lethal mutations.
Chemotherapy for cancer uses toxins of such strength that
patients may be overcome by drug toxicity, radiation therapy
carries with it possibilities of infertility and ulceration, and the
very method that detects cancer may in turn ca_use it. The
Ka thy Faber, a pre-med philosophy major, wrote a paper on
medical ethics for an independent study in Biology. This is a
condensed version written exclusivefv for Dialogue.
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The Serpent
medicine of the I 980's, then·, is a mixture of exciting cures and
treatments along with the potential for harmful consequences.
Coupled with the explosion of medical technology was the
proclamation of individual rights. A woman's right to vote was
recognized in 1920, and women . made great strides toward
equality in the l 970's in religious, economic, and social
structures. Rights for Afro-Americans became an issue in the
post-World War II era, and the l 950's and 60's were dominated
by the fight for legal and social acknowledgement of those
rights . The seventies, perhaps more than any previous decade,
was saturated by people insisting on their rights, jealously
guarding their autonomy.
But such innundation with personal rights is a rather recent
development in western history. Notions of man as
autonomous, self-reliant, and independent are firmly rooted in
the eighteenth-century enlightenment which brought forth the
Declaration of Independence, the Newtonian scientific
revolution, and the writings of Immanuel Kant. With the dawn
of the Enlightenment, the concept of man's dependence on a
supernatural being, the emphasis on eternity, and the
religiously saturated atmosphere of sin and bondage to a finite
world all faded, replaced by an emphasis on the individual
person and his rights.
It is out of this post-Enlightenment, technologically.
advanced context that philosophers, patients. and physicians
alike began to assert the rights of patients. In 1914 the American
courts clearly recognized the patient's right to self-determination when Justice Cardozo pronounced:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages. 2
Notice that in the court's guideline, no. mention is made of
weighing the morality of revealing the truth against any negative effects that information might have on the patient. But this
did not necessarily require the exchange of information regarding the patient's condition and alternatives; doctors routinely
dispensed of this duty by merely telling the patient what pro. cedures were to be· done, declining to mention possible risks or
options. In 1960 the courts clarified their position in Nathanson
v. Kline, arguing:
. Anglo-American law starts with the premise ofthoroughgoing self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, ifhe be
of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of
life-saving surgery or other medical treatment.3
Riding on a wave of autonomy, the doctrine of informed consent had come into its own.
The question of informed consent is based on a man's duty to

And Snake Oil
Kathy Faber
reveal the truth to another, and there is a wide range of opinions
on the extent of this duty. Immanuel .Kant, the eighteenthcentury philosopher, took an absolute stance toward this duty,
· emphatically stating:

Truthfulness in statements which we cannot avoid
making is the formal duty which each one owes to all
men, no matter how great a disadvantage may result
therefrom to him or to another . ... Every man has not
only a right but the strictest duty to be truthful in his
statements, and this duty he cannot avoid whether it
harms him or others. 4
In contrast to Kant, who relegates the possible effects of
revealing the truth to secondary importance, a vtilitarian view
such as that of Machiavelli considers the desired end as of
paramount importance and is unconcerned with the means used
in achieving that end:
Be it known, then, that there are two ways ofcontending,
one in ac.cordance with the laws, the other by force . ...
But since the first method is often ineffectual, it becomes
necessary to resort to the second. A prudent Prince
neither can nor ought to keep his word when to keep it is
hurtful to him. "5
Inasmuch as doctors ih the western world have been ascribed a
princely status, they, too, have been exempted from telling the
truth in situations where it would not be expedient. The notion
that truth must be modified or even negated arises from a
utilitarian ethic.which justifies lying in the interest of gaining a
desirable end. For Machiavelli, this end was the effective rule of
the people; for medicine, the end is the healing of the patient.
The dogmatism and unyielding fervor of Immanuel Kant
are a bit too simple in this complex w~rld which resists neat
categorization, Kant refuses to deal with the consequences of ·
his ethic whfoh demands unfailing revelation of the truth. Of
those who tell the truth Kant writes:
"He himself does not inflict harm upon whomsoever may
suffer from that truthfulness; the harm is caused by
accident. For he who acts is Y}Ot free to choose,· truthfulness being his unconditional duty, if he is bound to speak

a.i ali.
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BQt Kant does not satisfactorily establish the primacy of truth
over all other goods-its statl,ls as an •~unconditional duty"
needs a stronger base than he provides.
Kant does have a-valid point however, in his condemnation
of those who use others as means to ·a n end; he repeatedly argues
that men in themselves are .ends and must be respected as such.
A utilitarian ethic potentially encourages the denial of
individual rights by those in authority, leading to an undue
emphasis on expediency. In reacting against the categorical
imperatives of Kant, the utilitarian ethicist often sacrifices any

sense of pervasive, unchang:ng morality. He is rendered unable
to accept the biblical directives for Specific moral action and is
left with hollow or transient standards.
I wiU argue for an ethic based on moral principles-but
principles tempered by the realization that moral choice
involves competing goods and must be a result of careful
reflection, of weighing priorities, of considering the consequences, and of acknowledging the artificiality .of imposing
unbending categories on our complex world.
Although notions of dependence, responsibility, autonomy,
and human dignity are all relevant to a study of informed
consent, the debate over informed consent has been stated in
other terms. When one peels away the humanistic concept of
man, theologies of personhood, and utilitarian considerations,
what remains is a moral dilemma. The controversy over
informed consent, one could argue, stems from two competing
·goods: the duty of the physician to do everything in his power to
facilitate healing (and, therefore, to refrain from doing anything which would be harmful) and the moral obligation to tell
the truth. Joseph Fletcher, writing a decade before developing
his Situation· Ethics, casts the dilemma in terms of competing
evils and argues:
In all such affairs the evil committed (fully foreseen as a
tragic or undesired consequence) is condoned by
claiming that the good desired is at least proportionate
to, if it does not overbalance, the evil. These moralists
usually avail themselves ofa semantic confusion. A closer ·
examination will show that of the two evils between
which they urge us to choose, one is moral evil ( o,r sin)
and the other is some physical or social evil (suffering).
Now in Christian ethics, at least, one is not forbidden to
suffer for the sake of his obedience to the claims of love, .
for doing good. This ethic certainly offers no advice to
weigh the ethical satisfaction of acting virtuously against
the costs or consequences of doing so, in some hedonistic
scales balanced on self-regard and self-protection. 1
The humanistic philosopher Nicolai Hartmann counters with
the claim that opting for one moral good necessitates the
violation of the other (thus, one commits an evil in doing good).
·Here it is Hartmann who advocates a situation· ethics}
observing:
There are situations which place before a man the unescapable alternative either of sinning against truthfulness or
against some other equally high, or even some higher
value . ...
It is a po.rtentous error to believe that such questions
m(Jy be solved theoretically . .. .It is inherent in the
essence of such moral conflicts that in them value stands
against value and that it is not possible to escape from
them without being guilty . ...
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Real moral life is not such that one can stand guiltless
in it . .. .It is only unavoidable guilt which can preserve a
man from moral decay. 8
Hartmann's only advice to the physician is to follow his conscience and accept the responsibility for whatever ensues: "The
physician should decide according, .. to his own living sense of
the relative height of the respective values, and to take upon
himself the consequences, external as well as inward, ultimately
the guilt involved in the violation of one value. " 9
But Hartmann's method for solving ethical dilemmas is
untenable in two respects. Hartmann's final authority_ for
choosing between competing goods is the individual's
conscience, and, while this assumption constitutes good

"The more I practice
medicine, the more I am
convinced that every
physician should cultivate
lying as a fine art."
humanism, it is unacceptable to the Christian. Authority for
what is right lies with God, not fallen man. Despite Satan's
promise that eating the apple would bestow certain knowledge
of good and evil, time has failed to prove his claim; what one
man condemns as twisted evil, another lauds as naturally good.
Furthermore, the whole notion of conscience is somewhat
indefinite in its meaning. Is it an innate sense of the good, the
just, and the prudent? Is it the learned schema of what is socially
acceptable? Or is it the whispering of the Holy Spirit in a man's
ear, as the Sunday School teacher proposes?
Hartmann's directive is also unworkable in that the physician
is often incapable of accepting the responsibility for the consequences of his choice. Suppose he opts for concealing the truth
in a given situation in the interest of aiding his patient's wellbeing. In refusing to answer the patient's question, he may cause
greater distress in the patient who, in the absence of knowledge,
now imagines all sorts of dark possibilities (and impossibilities).
What would it mean for the doctor to accept responsibility for
the patient's emotional distress? Can the doctor actually bear
any weight of the patient's psychological burden? The doctor .is
responsible only in that he is the cause; he cannot accept responsibility in the senes of paying the penalty-he is powerless to do
this. The outcome of the doctor's choice is visited upon the
patient, and it is the patient who will either reap the benefits or
suffer the consequences.
Must we then opt for Fletcher's choice of the moral good over
the physical ( or mental) good? Fletcher commits the same error
as Hartmann-he writes, "In Christian ethics, at least, one is
not forbidden to suffer for the sake of his obedience to the
claims of love, for doing good." Although the physician is the
agent of obedience here, any suffering which may result from
this obedience will be the patient's, not the physician's; this is
precisely why the submission to treatment should be the
patient's decision, not the doctor's.
The fatal defect in Fletcher's position in his rigorous choice of
the moral over the physical or mental good. Fletcher here is
caught up in what the Reformed theologian and ethicist Lewis
B. Smedes terms the "lust for virtue," the insatiable thirst to do
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the good , even at the expense of inadvertently harming another.
The lust for virtue proclaims the primacy of the moral good
over healing and comfort, leading to pharisaical rigorism and
short-sightedness.
The Christian life is not a call to do good but to love, and the
·moral proscription against lying is proclaimed aot because "the
true" is some transcendent absolute, but because lying harms
people, destroys trust, and is simply not loving. Thus Christ
summed up the law not as a guide to virtuous living, but with the
command to love God above all else and one's neighbor as
oneself. Fletcher's choice here ignores personal responsibility
for the harm (physical or mental) of one's· "virtuous" decision;
such ignorance misses the proper thrust of the Christian's call to
reflect Christ's love.
We will return now to the disparity between truth and healing; so far we have assumed that they are in conflict. Although
ethical dilemmas may be posed with such stark contrast, the experiences of life do not always bear out such sharp distinctions.
Historically, medical professionals believed that, were the
patient told the seriousness of his condition, he would suffer a
relapse; this attitude persists even today. One physician explained , "The longer I practice medicine, the more I am convinced that every physician should cultivate lying as a fine
art .. .lies which contribute enormously to the success of the
physician's mission of mercy and salvation." 10
But the art of lying is one which some doctors choose not to
cultivate, opting rather fo r the art of truth-telling. This second
art is the key to escaping the dilemma as posed. The claim that
revelation of a patient's condition impedes healing .is not at all
documented; in fact, there is a substantial body of evidence to
the contrary. And revealing the truth to a patient need not
involve giving him a comp1,1ter printout analyzing his prognosis
and listing the probability of every conceivable side-effect.
Neither does informed consent entail a tedious recapitulation of
· a gross anatomy course or an understanding of the biochemical
mechanisms of enzyme activity.
Such extremes do not inform the patient but only confuse
him. Richard Cabot, an American physician in the early l 900's,
advocates tempering the truth:
A straight answer does not mean for me what is often
called the "blunt truth," the "naked truth," the dry, cold
facts. The truth that I mean is a true impression, a fully
drawn and properly shaded account. 11
It is by cultivating this art of truth-telling that the doctrine of
informed consent can normally escape from the dilemma of
truth and harm; thus, our primary emphasis is on this art.
But to hope that tact and sensitivity in telling the truth will
always be sufficient in preventing harm to the patient's mental
or physical well-being is naive indeed, and occasionally a situation may arise where explaining the illness and prognosis to the
patient will cause him considerable distress. To approach an
answer in this situation, it will be necessary to delve deeper into
the basis for informed consent.
The prevalent basis is the humanistic concept of the
individual's autonomy, also disguised as self-determination,
independence, or personhood. By virtue of his humanity, man
has an intrinsic worth, a dignity which demands that he be
recognized as worthy in his own right and is not merely an
instrument to be used to · achieve a desired goal. Man is a
rational being, and therefore is capable of making reasonable
decisions, acting upon those decisions, and assuming responsibility for the consequences of his own actions.

Autonomy hinges on a man's freedom of self-determination;
it implies freedom from coercion and the competence to act
rationally. Beauchamp a~d Childress, in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, trace the concept of autonomy to Kant's
freedom of the will and John Stuart Mill's freedom of action. 12
Kant's emphasis is on the recognition of the validity of an
individual's standards and calls for respect of the individual and
his decisions because of his intrinsic, unconditional worth. Mill,
on the other hand, emphasizes that a man must be free to act in
accordance with his own principles as long as his actions do not
diminish the autonomy of those around him, even if his actions
entail risk to himself or if his standards differ from those of the
community. Thus, a patient's refusal to submit to treatment for
a rapidly growing tumor must be honored if the decision stems
from deliberation based on his scale of priorities, even if that
refusal would result in certain death.
Christians in particular may find such concepts as man's
intrinsic worth and independence to be unpalatable, insisting
rather that man's worth is only through his relationship to
God-man is ascribed worth by the Creator; it is not his intrinsically. True as that may be, such objections over man's
intrinsic worth and self-dependence do not deal a serious blow
to the concept of autonomy. The issue here is not man's
relationship to God, but that of one man to another; while the
former is exclusively one of dependence, the latter is a relationship between two human beings, each with his own standards
and responsibilities.
. _.
.
~ Others will be repulsed by any assertion of man's rights;
instead, whenever a person's rights are abused, they suggest

turning the other cheek. Although their advice is based on
Scripture, not all Christian ethicists find the distinctions so
sharply defined. Man is created in God's image; by virtue of
man's imaging of his Creator, he tnust be treated with the same
respect and love that is due Christ. 13 God's image in man
·endows him with a dignity of sanctity which. must be honored
and preserved. From this dignity stems both the rights and .
the responsibilities of the individual. Paul Ramsey explains,
"Man is a sacredness in bodily life .... He is an embodied soul or
ensouled body. He is, therefore, a sacredness in illness and in his
dying .... The sanctity of human life prevents ultimate trespass
upon him, even for the sake of treating his bodily life. " 14 Henry
Stob, in his Ethical Reflections, puts it this way:
It is before the face of God that man attains to self-

identity, agency, ·and rationality-the essentia~
,ingredients of responsibility. .. ·.In the Judaeo-Christian
view man has dignity, for in his very being he is attached
to God, and in his constitution he resembles God. He is
imago ·dei-on which account there is a kind of sacredness about him which in each one's dealing with him must
be kept inviolate. ts
The humanistic notion of autonomy, then , -is more accurately
expressed in terms of responsibility. Man's self-identity,
agency, and rationality are typically given as support for man's
autonomy and self-determination. But while these God-given
capacities endow man with certain freedoms, they also obligate
him to accept certain responsibilities, both to himself and to
others. Autonomy is clearly limited; no man is capable of full
self-determination, and few actions do not infringe in some way
on the autonomy of at least one other person. Men are
necessarily dependent on. others for physical needs, emotional
. support, and religious purpose-in the poet's words, no man is
an island.
·
But man is inescapably responsible. As long as he stands in
the image .of God, as long as God has given him the ability to
deliberate and to act on his deliberations, he is obligated to act
responsibly and others are obligated to treat him with respect.
Nicholas W olterstorff, in his recent book Educating for
Responsible Action, reflects on man's responsibility:
The core of our uniqueness among earthlings is that
human beings and human beings alone are responsible.
They and they alone have duties, obligations. They and
they alone are capable ofguilt,for to be guilty is to violate
one's responsibilities. Christians do not see these responsibilities as free-floating. They see them as given by God.
Humanity alone God has graced wi_th responsibilities. 16
Man is responsible, Wolterstorff continues, not only to God,
but in how he acts in relation to himself and to his fellowmen. It
is not that man is a bundle of self-determination and intrinsic
rights, but that, by virtue of his unique relationship to God and
his reflection to the Creator, that he is to be treated with proper
respect and held responsible for his well-being. Thus, active involvement in one's own health care is not merely a right (which
may or m~y not be asserted), but it is a duty.
Essentially, then, informed consent when devising treatments or recommending procedures, is justified in modern
medicine precisely because the weighing of the tremendous
curative powers of the science against its sometimes formidable
potential for harm is a moral, not medical, choice, and moral
choice is the responsibility of the individual. Deciding what one
is willing to risk to effect a cure is a decision which should be
made by the patient, not the physician. In some cases, little
deliberation is needed-the possibility of a decreased platelet
count from high doses of aspirin is of little concern to the
patient with a raging fever. But in other situations, the benefits
do not so completely overwhelm the ·ris~s;_conside~ a wom~n
four months pregnant with a slowly growing abdominal mahgnancy-tr~atment to save her life cou_ld risk th~t of th~ fetus,
while waiting until the birth of the child would Jeopardize the
mother's life. Considerations here-value of the mother's life,
value of the child's life-are non-scientific. The decision as is
. increasingly the case in medicine, is not scientific in nature but is
based on priorities and moraljudgmen!s, ~s Ra?lsey says, "No
man is good enough to cure another without his consent;" 17 for
the doctor to make such decisions solely on the basis of his own
priorities is presumptuous.
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Even in revealing a diagnosis or prognosis, the doctor owes
his patient truthfulness out of respect for, to use Ramsey's
phrase, the patient as person. The physician should address the
patient not merely as a diseased body but as the union of
physical, psychological, social, and moral aspects. Stob writes:
[The patient] is to be treated always and only as a
person-never as an anonymous entity, never as mere
patient or object, never as a shallow existent without
those dimensions of depth and height by which he... is
constituted religious. 18
Holistic medicine, with its goal of treating the entire person,
may be a bit idealistic, but its attempt to return to a humane
approach in medicine is certainly laudable. And, if the claims of
holistic medicine are valid, recognition of the patient as a
person with privileges and responsibilities will not harm but
further his well-being.

"Knowing that the physician
lied to his wife, would the
man have any rea~on to trust
the doctor now?"
As noted before, - the most persuasive argument against
informed consent is that informing the patient will harm his
health, either by destroying his will to live or by inducing sideeffects by the power of suggestion. But the alternative to this is
lying, and, while lying may be immediately beneficial, its longra~ge effects are destructive. If trust is the essential ingredient in
a proper physician-patient relationship, lying is the most potent
destroyer of that trust. Suppose a doctor does not, tell a dying
woman the seriousness of her condition but reveals the
prognosis only to her husband so that he can make "t,he necessary arrangements." Ten years later the husband falls ill and is
told by the doctor that he is merely working too hard and
should ease up a bit. Knowing that the physician lied to his wife,
· would the man have any reason to trust the doctor now?
Richard Cabot, arguing from a utilitarian ethic, eloquently
states:
We think we can isolate a lie . . .and let its effects die
with the occasion that brought it about. But is it not
common experience that such customs are infectious qnd
spread far beyond our in-tent~on and beyond our control?
They beget, as a rule, not any acute indignation among
those who get wind of them. . . , but rather a quiet,
chronic incredulity which is stubborn, just in proportion
as it is vitally important in a given case to get at the real
truth . ...
A lie saves present pain at the expense of a greater
future pain, and if we saw as clearly the future harm as we
see the present good, we could not help seeing that tfze
balance is on the side of harm. It is intellectual shortsightedness.19
Notice here that Cabot is not concerned with Kant's notion of
the primacy of truth as a moral value; rather, arguing on the
basis of minimizing harm, he concludes that the physician is
obligated to be truthful in the interest of preserving trust.
To sum up, informed consent is justified by the responsibility
of the individual, the non.:.scientific balancing of risks against
benefits, the inability of the physician to assume responsibility
for the deleterious consequences of his treatment, and the
erosion of trust by concealing the truth. When diagnosis and
prognosis are revealed with tact and sensitivity, the physician
can help the patient cope with his situation and maintain his
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hope. While I hesitate to make informed consent an unbending
requirement, to admit of exceptions paves the way for a
relativistic ethic emptied of significance. If Hartmann is correct,
if moral life necessarily implies unavoidable guilt, I choose to be
guilty on the side of ethical rigorism.

Up

to this point the discussion of truth-telling and informed consent has been for the most part, blissfully theoretical. But to show merely that informed consent is a good idea, or
even to prove that it is morally required, is insufficient. A physician's duty is not primarily to debate moral questions but to
deal with the sick, and all of this philosophical talk will be
naught if it has no practical implications.
The main concern in the implementation of informed consent
is to sensitively give enough information so the patient can
make a rational decision based on the risks and benefits of treatment, but not to give so much information that the patient becomes overwhelmed, confused, or hysterical. Neither may we
become enamored with some lofty notion of fully autonomous ·
patients complete with encyclopedic medical knowledge:

The phrase "informed consent" now evokes the same sort
of magic expectations one -sees in fairy tales, where
uttering magic words or per/arming magic deeds
transforms frogs into princes. The proponents of "informed consent" seem to believe that, once kissed by the
doctrine, frog patients will be autonomous princes.
However, a new current of thinking worries that informed consent can, on the contrary, turn prince-patients
into sickly frogs.2°
What, then, shouid be the standards for determining how much
information to give? Historically, physicians used the local
practice as their guide: the doctor was expected to follow the
standard of his community and relay as much information as ·
his colleagues. But this relativistic standard was struck down by
the courts as early as 1903, when Judge Homes of Texas argued,
"What usually is done may be evidenced of what ought to be
done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of
reasonable prudence whether it is usually complied with or
not. "21
This sentiment was upheld in later judicial decisions, and the
guide for determining the extent of information to be offered
became that which areasonable man would want to know. Not
only does this standard negate the idea of "if everyone does it, it
must be right," but it avoids having one standard for the
independent, assertively autonomous patient and another for
the dependent or extremely sensitive patient.
First and foremost, the discussion of prognosis and alternative treatments must use unambiguous language which the
patient can understand. Donagan charges that "a physician is
simply not competent if he is unable to describe, in words
intelligible to his patients, everything that could matter to them
as patients about the character of any course of treatment he
proposes."22 For· example, an oncologist may tell a newly
diagnosed cancer patient that a certain regimen of
chemotherapy has an ·80 percent response rate. Although
"response rate" merely means the percentage of patients whose
tumors shrink by at least half after therapy, the cancer patient
may interpret the oncologist's words as promising an 80 percent
chance of cure. When a radiation therapy patient is warned of
the possibility of "mucous membrane reaction" the physician
must be certain the patient explicitly understands this phrase;
does the patient know that mucous membrane reaction means ·
inflamation of the lungs (leading to chest pain and respiratory
dysfunction) and digestive system (leading to diarrhea, lesions,
and ulceration)? If. not, the informed consent procedure is

meaningless.
The minimum requirements in obtaining informed consent
are as follows:
I. a description and explanation of the patient's condition and
prognosis,
2. a presentation of the alternatives (if applicable),
3. an explanation of the recommended treatment which
includes the intended results and collateral risks;
4. an offer to answer any questions and to provide the patient
with more detailed information if he so desires.
5. If the patient refuses treatment, he should be informed of
the probable medical consequences of this refusal.
Consent forms by themselves are of dubious value. While
they are necessary to codify the agreement between physician ·
and patient and provide evidence of the permission granted to
the physician, .they do not guarantee that the patient understands the information given him or has made his decision after
considering the intended benefits and possible risks. ConsenC
forms should be presented only afier the patient has discussed
the matter thoroughly with the physician and has been given the
opportunity to ask any questions. The oral discussion should be
supplemented by written descriptions, booklets, or directions
which provide the patient with a permanent record of the
information. Some hospitals are experimenting with visual aids
such as slides, filmstrips, and videotapes. Whereas consent
forms may discharge the legal obligation e>f the physician to
obtain consent, forms by themselves seldom discharge his
moral obligation. Comprehension varies greatly from patient to
patient and every effort must be made to translate the medically
significant facts into easily accessible language. The use of
multiple forms of communication and repetition will also
facilitate comprehension. Quizzing the patients after presentation ·of the information may bring to light difficulties and

deficiencies in the presentation.
Precise data on patient .reaction to information concerning
diagnosis, prognosis, treatments, and risks is sketchy and
conflicting; more controlled research needs to be done in this
area. Preliminary studies suggest that, on the whole, patients
are much more resilient than expected in dealing with serious
illness. G.J. D'Angio, in a study of long-term lymphoma and
leukemia survivors, writes:
Adults react in a variety of ways ranging from calm
acceptance to rage and suicidal despair. It is nonetheless
generally believed that a full and frank disc·ussion is the
best approach to most patients.23
When patients do react to the truth with despair or hypochondria, the physician is responsible for trying to alleviate
these problems; depression or despair can usually be conquered
and does not constitute grounds for abandoning the principle of
truth-telling.
.
Ethical delibera.t ion is not the selection of the good over
the evil but necessitated by the conflict of competing goods.
Opting for one good may hamper or even destroy the otherthis is the dilemma of ethical life. Physicians and patients alike
must recognize the patient's responsibility to take an active
part in his health care, and if confronting the patient with the ·
truth jeopardizes his confidence in the physician's ability to help
or dampen his hope, that risk must be taken. While I have
chosen to sacrifice the exceptions· for the sake of the rule, the
situational ethicist sacrifices the rule for the exception.
Relativizing ethical norms for the sake of the exception leaves
the door wide open to the abuse of patients by doctors too eager
to effect cures or blind to the limitations of their treatments.
Truth-telling and informed consent, imp'erfect and
exceptionable as they may be, protect us all.
-
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Words and Works:
Tim Grubbs is a senior participating in Calvin's Bachelor of Fine Arts
Program. He came to Calvin from
Korea where his parents are involved
in mission work at Jeonju.

At Calvin, the media with which I have worked are those
used for drawing, printmaking (specifically woodcut and
intaglio), and painting (acrylic and oil). In each area I enjoy
pushing the media to an extreme. I don't believe that it is
necessary to use only an unadulterated medium i.e. using paint
only in · painting, pencil only in pencil drawings. Rather, I've
been combining the various media and processes in mixed
media pieces. For example, I might work into an etching using .
paint, crayons, pencil, perhaps elements of collage ....
I like to deal with things that relate to my experience and
human experience in general. I attempt to do art that functions
as a "window onto reality." By this I mean that I wish my art to

Temptation I
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be more than just a manipulation of media resulting·in a selfcontained art object. It is that, of course, but I don't want its
significance to end there. I want it to go further, that through
the media and imagery it might get at a perception of a reality of
human experience-one which is not limited to what we can see
with our eyes. At times I really struggle with this tension: the
work functioning as ·an art object that can be looked at strictly
in terms of aesthetic concerns and the work functioning as
something like an icon that points to something beyond itself.
At the moment I feel I can best depict such a reality through
thematic, figurative works. Sometimes I work from Biblical
themes, sometimes from imaginary themes which are either preconceived or which evolve during the working process. The
Biblical themes are usually quite indirect or subtle. For
instance, last semester I did a series that dealt with the Temptation of Christ. But I wouldn't expect someone to necessarily
recognize it as such. So much of the interpretation of a piece
depends on who the viewer is. I'm not trying to appeal to a
specific audience and certainly not to an exclusively Christian
audience. All of the themes I deal with are highly personal,
regardless of whether they are Biblical themes or not. The most
important thing for me is that I am faithful to the Lord as an
artist (since I consider this my vocation). I would hope that my
work might be an instrument as an icon can be, in directing one
towards God.
Although I'm working with figures and landscapes, I'm not
working in a truly representational vein. That is, I'm not trying
to copy nature and don't usually work from models. The figures
and their settings come out of my memory or my imagination.
The way I handl~ the subject matter results from a synthesis of
modeling in the classical sense and non-objective treatment of
media and composition. For example, a figure's face will be
modeled but not at all as a photographic image; the body might ·
be treated as almost pure, flat textured pattern, the environment might be similarly simplified into flat textural forms.
Perhaps this type of abstraction can best be understood in
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·terms of "symbol." The figures I do are more like symbols of
people than photographic renderings of them; the tree in "I am
nothing without You" is a symbol of an apple tree: a massive
green shape with red dots and a brown shape. A red dot doesn't
make an apple'. It's only a symbol of an apple. Along with this
simplification, comes a flattening out of space into pattern. In
"Children be Vulnerable" the figures are 'in front' of a plane of
polka dots and 'behind' a plane of stripes: the figures are seated
at a table with a striped tablecloth in front of a wallpapered
wall.
The painting called "After the Tempest" is based on the·
theme of Christ in the wilderness with the angels after the
Temptation. It's like a window onto four figures dancing and
ministering to each other and yet parts of the figures are represented simply by large flat shapes with little modeling. These,
along with bands that echo the support bars of the frame, witness that this is indeed a flat canvas. It is an art object, and yet it
is more than just that.
Sometimes the symbols that I use touch on a universal
perception of elements of the world in which we live. For .
instance, I might paint an area blue because it is sky; another
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area green because it is grass. But, then again, I have no rules for
doing these things and I might just as easily make a river brown
as I have done in the wood-cut "The River." I enjoy working
with a play of representation, flat pattern, shape, texture and
color using a variety of media and technique and I try to be as
intuitive about it as I can. Things usually don't work for me
when I am too rational and analytical.
When I think of influences on my work, I-think of people like
Bruce Cockburn and Thomas Merton or a magazine like
Sojourners. Bruce Cockburn, for instance, a contemporary
Canadian musician, fascinates me by the way he integrates his
Christianity and his art form. His lyrics are very thoughtful and
visually oriented and yet remain subtle. There's an integrity to
his work that sometimes comes out in playfulness, sometimes in
rawness, but always in sincerity.
I think the concept of the artist as a suffering masochistic
hero is foolishness. One's artistic abilities should be seen as a gift
rather than an ego-trip. It's crucial, especially for a Christian
artist, to have a sense of justice for other people. In our society
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art has become so much of a frivolous luxury that artists participate in oppression of the poor. Their entire lives tend to be
wrapped up in a system that gives very little thought to these ·
problems.
·
I would like to see a little bit of my art stay with me, some of it
go to my friends, a little bit of it go to those who want to buy it
and someday I hope that most of it will go to those who can't
afford it. I don't know how I'd be able to channel my art into the
: lives of those who don't normally see art because I suspect that
they might not be interested in it. But it's something I seriously
think about. With this type of goal it's doubtful that I'll be able
·to live off my art; I'll probably have to get a job to support
myself unless I'm able to do my art in the context of a supportive community.

,The Laboratory of History:
What to Write
On Your
Tabula
Rasa
Arvin Vos

Recently William Harry Jellema, Professor of Philosophy
Emeritus, the doyen of Calvin philosophers, lunched with the
philosophy department. Jellema's first question to the members
was this: "Are you taking the history of philos~phy seriously?"
For those familiar with Jellema's views, the question will come
as no surprise. Jellema has always had a lively interest in, and a
great love for, the history of philosophy. One sometimes has the
suspicion that for him there is little or no great philosophy in _
the twentieth century. In the context of positivism, analytic
philosophy, ordinary language philosophy, Wittgensteinian
language games, and more, Jellema turned to the classics in the
philosophical tradition. He saw them as the primary means by
which to acquire and to transmit a philosophical education.
In reply to Jellema's question, one's initial reaction is to say,
"We teach classes in the history of philosophy,just as we always
have." This, however, would sidestep the thrust ofthe _question.
The real issue is whether the history of philosophy is being taken
seriously. Whether it is or not, I leave to others to decide. I will
limit myself to asking why this history should be taken

Arvin Vos is a visiting professor ofphilosophy at Calvin and a
close friend of Thomas Aquinas.

seriously, and, gra·nted that it should be, how this is to be· done.
Looking at mathema~ics, the natural. sciences, and even the
social sciences, one finds little or no attempt ·being made to
acquaint students in these areas with the history of their respective disciplines. Nor does it seem to be the case that the best
scientists in these areas are necessarily aware of such history;
indeed, they usually are not. One wonders why the situation
should be any different in philosophy. In light of the fact that in
mathematics and the empirical sciences one can function quite
well without a knowledge of history, the burden of proof is on
the person who wants to argue that philosophy is different. I am
going to argue that there are a number of reasons why the
history of philosophy is important-for its cultural significance, for the teaching of philosophy, and for philosophy itself.
F:irst, there is the relation between philosophy and culture.
Philosophy provides, among other things, a broad
understanding of reality; it is not only a study of what is but a
vision of what can be. As such, philosophy becomes the basis on
which men act and so it shapes history. So, to understand our
own age, it is important to understand Marxist thought. Closer
· to home, to understand the Reformed tradition one will do well
to study Augustine, for Augustine's conception of Christian
philosophy is still to be felt in various currents at Calvin.
The sciences also have an impact on culture, but the impact of
philosophy is both more profound and longer lasting. Sciences
determine man's understanding of the world about him and
even aspects of his own being, but philosophy goes beyond this
to articulate nian's conception of himself.' Hence its influence is
more profound. It is also longer lasting for science soon
becomes dated, but · philosophy has a perennial relevance.
Greek science is of merely historical interest, but its philosophy
continues to inspire today.
A second reason for studying the history of philosophy is that
there are· memorable moments in it which simply are not found
elsewhere. There are in the philosophical tradition works which
appeal both to the imagination and the understanding. Think of ·
Socrates' defense in the Apology, Plato's allegory of the cave as
a picture of intellectual enlightenment in The Republic, the
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moral earnestness of Marcus Aurelius in his Meditation,
Augustine's account in his Confessions of his conversion to
philosophy and the long, tortuous route that finally led to
Christianity. And so one might continue. To grapple with the
issues and to relive the struggles recounted in these works enriches greatly. Works of this kind embody a range and depth of
human experiences to which everyone should be exposed and

·way one can follow the mam stages in the h{story of philosophy
and so have a context in which to set contemporary discussions.
Often this will require that students gain some knowledge of the
original culture in which the philosophy was written, but this
added labor will have its own beliefs. The emphasis on
· philosophy will complement the emphasis on history, both of
which seek to promote our understa 1ding of ourselves.

which often cannot be found elsewhere.
These works are powerful precisely because they teach on
more than one level. For teaching this is an important factor.
Students who will not be moved in the least by an abstract statement of an issue can be roused to puzzle over it when it is put
concretely. 'The Individual versus the State' as a topic for discussion might leave most students unmoved, but there are very
few who, when reading the Crito, will not be roused to try to
find some way in which Socrates can both live according to his·
principles and yet avoid execution. The history of philosophy is
a repository of interesting materials which can be very helpful in
the teaching of philosophy. It is foolish to neglect them.
Thirdly, in the history of philosophy .:>ne can find discussions
which help to enlighten current discussions. Often in reading a
contemporary philosopher, one finds both that the viewpoint is
very complex and that it can be understood only against the
background of his predecessors. Current discussions of an issue
typically assume knowledge of a great deal that went on before
The idea is that one can unravel some of the complexity of contemporary discussions by returning to earlier debates. In this
way the history of philosophy can play a useful role in clarification.
The history often does more than this however. In philosophical discussions it often happens that bringing the position of
some historical figure into the discussion is not a reverting to the
past, but is more like calling upon a contempora y. Copernicus
was a great scientist, but one would hardly call on him in a discussion of current issues in astronomy. Plato, by contrast,
continues to be relevant to current philosophical discussions ..
The work of great philosophers does not become dated in the
same way as that of scientists. Why this is the case will be
explained later. Here it is enough to note the fact.
Given the fact that there is development in the complexity of
philosophical discussions, one way of making the entrance to
philosophical thinking less difficult is by introducing the new
student to earlier discussions which were simpler in form. In thi-,

Fourthly, th-e history of philosophy expands the scope and
depth of one's thought. At any given time, there are relatively
few philosophical issues which are the focus of intensive debate.
On othe issues, one finds that philosophe s adopt relatively
uncritical positions. For example, when questions concerning
ontology-questions about the genera! structure of what there
is-are the focal point of discussion, then epistemological
issues-how we know-are often handled relatively simplistically, logic may be probed in detail, but philosophy of man neglected, etc. While it is no doubt beyond the ability of most persons to be creative in a variety of areas at once, through
familiarity with the history of philosophy, one can remain
better informed with relatively less effort
The same point can be made in another w y The history of
philosophy can be regarded as ·he laboratory of philosophy. In
the history of philosophy one can see the imp 1ications of a
position being worked out. Decartes proposed a method and
adopted a criterion; his successors picked up where he left off,
trying m various ways to resolve he difficulties which remained
in the Cartesian framework. In other philosophical movements
one can see the same phenomenon at work The essential point
is this: one cannot hope io discover on one's own what a whole
series of brilliant men in the past worked their entire lives to
clarify. Just as one would not presume to work out mathematics on one's own bui. consults mathematical texts, so in
· philosophy, besides the har way of making discoveries for oneself, there is the easier way of follow·ng out the clues left by
others. Just as Soc ates served as a midwife for the slaveboy, so
the history of philosophy serves as a midwife for philosophers.
In this same vein, the medievals sometimes spoke of themselves as pyg ies on the shoulders of giants. On his own, a
pygmy cannot see far, but perched on he shoulders of a giant he
can· see farther than the giant himself. One's own ab1hty may in
no way be comparable to that of a Plato or an Aristotle, hut if
one can first learn from them and then add one's own contribution, there is the possibility that one may be able to see
more than they did. There is an accumulation of wisdom in the
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philosophical tradition which it would be unfortunate to miss.
A fifth consideration stems from a peculiar situation that
obtains in philosophy but is not found in the sciences. In the
,ciences, a student is normally able to assume that there is a
body of knowledge in the field that is well-founded . He must
become acquainted with this body of knowledge, must understand the method by which it was derived, and be able in

~method cannot be ascertained in the abstract. Should one use.a .
:deductive method in philosophy or a method ofuniversal doubt
or some other? It is not possible to determine by some criterion
of pure reason which of these methods will be most adequate.
They can be judged only by their results. It is in the history of
philosophy that these results are available for inspection. For
later thinkers it is the history of philosophy which makes a pre-

principle to derive it for himself; but there is no need for him to
verify all the experiments for himself. While one must know the
current status of the science, the reasonable thing to do is to
assume that what others have done is correct and to go on to
specialize in some area to make a contribution of one's own.
Now in philosophy such an approach is unworkable. The
problem is not that there is no philosophical tradition, but
ratht:r that there are a variety of philosophical traditions.
Whereas a science normally has one accepted viewpoint which
dominates the field, in philosophy one normally finds a variety
of traditions . .The variety has its roots in the fact that philosopher's use fundamentally different approaches. These different approaches have their basis in different conceptions of the
nature of knowing and of objectivity. Moreover, they lead to
different results.
If the co-existence of diverse, competing traditions is the
usual situation in philosophy-and here I simply want to claim
thatthis is the usual situation without explaining why this is
so-then the student of philosophy faces a problem which
students of the sciences do not normally have to face. (I say
"normally" because there are times when there are competing
traditio_ns in a given science, as when a basic view-point is
undergoing revision or when philosophical commitments have
caused a division as seems to be the case with the divisions in
psychology.) From the very beginning philosophy has been
divided into schools, most of which have their new adherents in
every era. The student of philosophy cannot simply join
whatever philosophical movement is current, but he must
attempt to make an informed choice. The various philosophies
are competitors, each having its own methods and its own
results. Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Idealism, etc.
have their own methods and their corresponding conceptions of
reality. In philosophy, results and method are tied together. The
choice of a method involves a personal commitment; one must
defend his choice of method as well as his results.
What is desirable is tha·t this choice of method be made as
intelligently as possible. The implications of a particular

liminary investigation of the merits of various methods pos_sible. While the pre-Socratics set up one philosophical position
after another, Aristotle was able to profit from their efforts by
noting how in their works Lhere was a progressive clarification
of various types of cause. It seems that the history of philosophy
reveals the relation between various methods and their results,
so making possible for later thinkers an informed choice with
regard to their own choice of method.
There is a sixth and fin~l point. The content of the history of
philosophy is necessary to complete the all-inclusive viewpoint
·.which philosophy seeks. Most philosophies aim at presenting
'.an all~inclusive viewpoint. Even those that do not witness to
this demand when they feel compelled to explain why this goal
must be abandoned. An all-inclusive viewpoint does not
attempt to incorporate all the details of reality, but rather to
.integrate the methods by which the details of reality can become
· known. In other .words, philosophy is not concerned with the·
details of everyday experience and of physics and of biology,
etc., but it is concerned with determining how these methods ·
can be integrated into one unified whole. Now Platonism,
Ari~totelianism, empiricism, rationalism, Kantianism, etc. are
just so many proposals as to how this project is to be carried out . .
In seeking to establish an all-inclusive viewpoint, a
· philosophy cannot ignore the differences in its own history.
Because the empirical sciences are concerned only with one
aspect of things, they are under no obligation to explain their
own development nor the fact of various conflicts that may be
found in the field. Philosophy, by contrast, precisely because it
endeavors to attain an all-inclusive viewpoint is also under the
obligation of explaining its own history, especially the fact that •
it has been dominated by different schools and traditions since
it began. Without such an account, one has the irony that the
very science which has a goal which is all-inclusive has itself a
fragmented and unintelligible.history, where one position after
another arises and falls for apparently no reason at all. In fact,
there are reasons, and it is one of the tasks of philosophy to sort .
these out and so explain its own checkered history.
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Granted that the history of philosophy should be studied,
·how is this to be done? The answer is philosophically! Just as the
scientists must ask the right questions of the object he studies, so
the philosopher must ask the right questions of the history of
philosophy. Failing to do this, one will find the history of philosophy a closed book. I will indicate three ways of studying this
history, the first two of which are inadequate and the third of
which is satisfactory.
1. The impressionistic approach.
The person using the impressionistic approach turns to the
history of philosophy and reads in it, but attends only to those
ideas which happen to interest him or which are an anticipation
of his own views. He focuses on these and regards the· rest as
quaint. Like a traveller in a foreign country who goes from one
tourist hangout to another and makes no real effort to enter the
life of the culture he is visiting, this kind of philosopher makes
no attempt to enter into the philosophical world of his predecessors. He tends to read the history of philosophy in much the
same fashion that scientists have been prone to look upon the
history of their respective areas. The history usually consists in
noting some brilliant insights which, alas, were before their time
and so failed to reach their potential in the past, but which have
finally come to their own in the present. There are books on the
history of philosophy which use such an approach. As one of
my colleagues has remarked, such books could be subtitled,
"Thoughts which occurred to me while reading ... "-filling in
the name of the appropriate philosopher. Both tourist and
. philosopher in the cases mentioned fail to gain what 1s
essential-having one's horizon enlarged.
2. The "purple passage" approach.
This type is taken from literature, where I suspect that it is
found even more than in philosophy. In the literary case a
person finds a favorite passage and simply lifts it out of its
original setting. He may be found quoting:

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
·
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
In connection with this passage he thinks edifying thoughts
about the futility of life, its meaninglessness, its stupidity, its
senselessness, and so on, but he never troubles to find out what
the passage meant in the context in which Shakespeare placed
it. The problem is not that the edifying thoughts which such a
person thinks are uninteresting, but rather that they are simply
his own thoughts. Such a person is merely introducing his own
perspective into the passage; he does not get beyond himself.
Instead of being broadened by Shakespeare's world, a hterary
narcissism results.
In philosophy there is a similar phenomenon. One finds an
interesting passage and simply lifts it from the context m which
it was originally found. Having done this, one begins to analyze
such a passage intensively. With great subtlety, possible
meanings for the various terms in the passage are explored. If
no meaning which renders the argument valid occurs in the
course of the analysis, then one sets about giving possible
reconstructions of the argument. This too can be interesting and
even valuable. Analyzing an argument in great detail is an
important skill. The problem is, nevertheless, the same as with
the literally parallel. Basically, one finds in the argument only
what one puts into it. One may happen to have the same understanding of the basic terms as the author, but if that under""
standing is lacking, there is nothing in this method which will
enable one to overcome ~his basic deficiency. Such a reader, for
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all his skill and ingenuity, will also only find his own perspectives in an argument lifted and isolated from its original
context and meaning. If there is literary narcissism, there is also
· philosophical narcissism.
3. Some observations on a critical reading of the history
of philosophy.
How is the history of philosophy to be read? It must be read
philosophically. But what does this mean? First of all, this is the
opposite of the view that one should approach the history of
philosophy with a blank mind, a tabula rasa. One learns only
when asking questions. It is the one who is the most active
questioner who is most likely to learn.The way to learn is riot by
keeping all one's preconceptions out of the picture, but by
bringing all one's abilities to bear upon a text.
Necessarily, we begin with our own understanding. When we
first read a term, we will undestand it in the context in which we
have known it before. However, if our own understanding of
the term differs from that of the auth0r we are reading, we will
soon find that he uses a term in a context where we would not
use it or uses it in a fashion that we do not recognize. The key is
to follow up such clues, to work our way around another's
thought until we can anticipate his every move. From the
original context we must move on to other contexts in which the
same term appears, comparing, evaluating and analyzing.
Systematically, we will try to enlarge the context, relating the
term in question to other terms as well as to its employment in
other works. We move on to the author's opera omnia and even
the writings of predecessors, contemporaries, and followers. By
recovering the context, we are gradually drawn out of our own
world with its preoccupations and interests into the world of the
author we are studying. When such a change occurs, then the
history of philosophy is being taken seriously.
To understand other's language it is necessary to understand
his thought. To do this it is necessary to acquire a set of insights
which comprise the basic structure of that author's position.
Here is the real worth of the study of the history of philosophy,
for engaging in such study, we will find that in order to understand the greats of the past, we will have to rise to their level of
understanding. But then the result will not j ust be a grasp of
some position held in the past, but there will be effected a
change in ourselves. This is the benefit to be gained from the
history of philosophy. This change will have prepared us to
make a contribution in the present, a contribution which will be
all the richer for having been informed by the thought of others.
Returning to Professor Jellema's question, we can see why
is worth pondering. Today the dominance of the empirical
sciences might lead us to suppose that their ahistorical method
was appropriate in philosophy also. Consideration of the
special character of the philosophical enterprise calls this view
into question. Scientists carry on their dis.cussions only with .
contemporaries because the empirical method renders past
findings obsolete. In philosophy the situation is different. The
issues are perennial, and so the contributions of the great
philosophers of the past are never merely of historical interest.
The voices from the past continue to influence and inform
current discussions. For philosophers Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and so many more are
contemporaries.
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Gallery Nineteen
African·:ldoma
Mask
Masks are a major form of visual
ideological expression in most cultures.
Used as props for masquerades, masks
embody individual and universal ideas
through emblematic decoration and their
use in performance.
This mask, from the ldoma people of
the cultural belt in Nigeria, is a grouping
of faces rising in an exponential curve. ·
William Fagg, a noted Africanist, interprets this curve as symbolic of the continuity of .life.
The mask type, called unga/a/i, is used
many times during the year. The wearer
carries the mask on top of his head; palm
fronds, grasses, or fabric are strung
through the small holes at the base to
cover his face. Many similar masks have
beak-like pinchers protruding approximately four inches from the bands between the carved faces.
The mask is made of light wood called
maligna and painted with natural
pigments. Except for the birds (eating
ripe fruit) at the top, the entire mask is
carved and hollowed from a single piece
of wood.

-James Kuiper

ldoma mask obtained in 1968, from James ljabo, an ldoma student at Wm. Bristow
Secondary School.
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·Recently Dialogue sponsored a discussion, organized by
Steve Van Till, among Professors Arie Leegwater (chemistry),
Del Ratzsch (philosophy), David Van Baak (physics), and
Gordon Van Harn (biology) with a little help from Paul Baker
(ill-informed layperson). The topics ranged from "everyday table-.
top experience" to quantum physics. Here, Dialogue presents a
shortened version of the actual discussion: as usual we have
tried to strike a happy balance between free conversational style
and the conventions of written prose.
Baker: We've brought together three natural scientists and one
philosopher of science to discuss the common ground of their
disciplines. Before beginning, we may as well discuss how far
such a discussion is appropriate, and what it is they have in
common. Should the scientist be expected to examine the philosophical implications of his discipline? Should a philosopher of
science also be a doer of science? Are the fields mutually
exclusive?_How do the disciplines relate?
Ratzsch: The important things done in the last twenty years in
the philosophy of science have been done because some philosophers of science have finally decided, "Okay, instead of
theorizing about what's going on or what should go on, perhaps
we should find out exactly what it is scientists are doing and
then try to figure out why it's working and what they should
do." That's been a complete turn around in a way. Earlier in the
century, philosophers said, "Well, let's look at scientists because they're making progress, and let's do our philosophy like
that." But, at first they got it completely confused and even got
some scientists confused.
Of course, you can't just take science as a given either. You
can't just philosophically step back and think about it for a
while without any background. It is important for students at
an undergraduate level to get some historical and philosophical appreciation of the questions in the scientific discipline.
A familiarity with the history of science and some philosophy of
science would keep scientists from making some of the bizarre
statements that they make. Just a few months ago I heard a
cosmologist stand up and claim, "We now know everything we
need to describe everything that happens in the entire universe."
What person who has heard that claim made fifteen times ever
in the last two hundred years-and seen every one of those
claims blown away within five years-could stand up and make
that sort of statement?
Van Harn: My experience in the laboratories I've worked in, is
that scientists pay very little attention to that sort of question.
Only a very few begin thinking about it. Once when I attended a
conference, I asked some post-docs in the physiology labs if
they knew anything about the conference or had attended any .
of the lectures. They just sort of snorted and laughed and said,
. "No, we don't wa11t anything to do with that." It seems to me
that's typical of other scie11tists. Often, philosophy seems to be
something which many scientists leave until they're near retirement.
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Ratzsch: That may be true of the young scientists in the middle
of the talent hierarchy, but the really good scientists express and
have an interest in philosophical questions all along the way.
Look at the list of people who were doing tremendously important things earlier in the century. Almost all of them were
deeply interested in these questions early on. Some of them
actually got into physics because they initially came across some
of these philosophical questions and decided that the answers
they were finding couldn't be right.
Leegwater: That's also part of their training.
Ratzsch: Yeah, they're European. They were aware of the
history of the discipline. They were forced to participate in
philosophical discussion, and it came very natural.
Van Haak: The revolution in geology in the last decade, in
tectonics and all that, seems to have been almost free of philosophical questions. A classic scientific revolution where the
entire community of geologists swung over from snorting at a
point of view to accepting it wholeheartedly, and yet there was
no soul searching of the philosophical implications. On the
other hand, in physics, sometimes the progress is made by
asking these philosophical questions.
Leegwater: Some disciplines too seem to lend themselves more
to a philosophical reflection-there is a lot of philosophy of
physics. But you have to look hard to find a philosophy of
chemistry article.
Baker: Some scientists may not always be too excited about
philosophy, but certainly other "softer" disciplines have in the
last century or so, become enamored of the scientific method.
Schools of philosophy and literary criticism, for example, have
wholeheartedly adopted the notion that the search for objective
knowledge by the scientific method is the road to truth. Is this ·
appropriate? Should the scientific method be norm_ative for
other disciplines?
Ratzsch: When you ask whether or not the scientific method
should be normative, the answer to that might be yes, but the
people who have claimed to be applying scientific method to
various other disciplines, in particular philosophers early in this
century, just plain were confused about what scientific method
was; they weren't applying scientific method. They thought they
were, and they came up with these utterly bizarre results, and
accepted the results instead of wondering if they'd gotten
the scientific method right. So it seems to me that just looking at
the disasters that have been caused by people in other fields
claiming to have applied scientific method, in fact, isn't clearly
relevant to whether or not scientific method should be normative. First we have to settle on what scientific method is, and
that's still a question that hasn't been settled. I mean, many
scientists know how to do it quite well, but when you ask them,
"Okay, what are you doing?" you don't always get quite the
answers that you might want.
Van Haak: But suppose you take as a summary statement of the
method that you want to check whether the logical
consequences of your hypothesis -are in agreement with
experience. Then the question is, "What really is experience?"

Leegwater: It has to solve the simple: It can't solve the three
body problem for example.
Van Baak: That's right. If you have two bodie.s moving under
mutual gravitation, that's ah easy problem to solve. Three
bodies: it doesn't work. In any discipline where the subject is
intrinsically complicated I'd be surprised if the scientific
methodology made results that have any value.
Van Till: Aristotle said that if you ask a scientific question,
then you will get something of a scientific answer, but it's only a
scientific answer. After that it's all finished.
Van Baak: fo addition, in physics, we consciously idealize a
particle, then we idealize that particle into an isolated particle,
and then we consciously treat it as a passive recipient of outside
forces.
·
Leegwater: I sometimes think that people in the humanities
aren't conscious eriough of that deliberate technique or misappropriate it when they apply it, for example, to psychology.
Baker: on · the other hand, physics, for .example, has led to a
view of the universe, only put forward within the past half
century, that violently conflicts with our common . sense

Ratzsch: See, Dave, if you hadn't gone through physics grad
school then you could think straight like the rest of us.
Van Baak:That brings up the question of scientific revolutions,
because I think one of the lessons about a scientific revolution is
that people adopt a ~ew way of thinking. It's not just a·matter of
coming to terms with new experimental data or having a new
.model. Fundamentally, the vocabulary and the thought processes change. But I like to think that those changes are almost
forced upon us by the observations. In effect, nature is teaching
us in what terms it wants to be described.
Ratzsch:Well, the historical evidence is kind of mixed. Some of
the major revolutions came about without new information at
all.
.
.
Van Baak: As a reinterpretation of old information.
Baker:Then one can always link these revolutions very nicely to
the social atmosphere of the times.
Leegwater: Yes, . there are studies like that. For example,
supposedly the dissolution of Weimar Germany allowed the
reception of the indeterminacy principle to gain _a foothold.
There are arguments that way. You can always place it in a
social setting. It isn't a cause and effect relationship, but I think
we're becoming more and more aware of the social setting in
which scientific revolutions take place.
Baker: And if you push that to the radical extreme by the now
familiar argument that we see nothing beyond our psychological, social, political, etc. structures, what's the scientists'
response to that?
Van Baak: I think that's fundamentally fallacious. However
disillusioned Germany might have been in the 30's, the indeterminacy principle would not have been accepted if it disagreed flatly with experiments in atomic physics. No matter
how disillusioned people are, they can't foist upon the scientific
community a law of that. magnitude unless they somehow have
data to back it up.
·
Van Till: Well, you were talking earlier about how in
psychology sometimes "scientific method" yields results that
don't comport with experience; they explain away so many ?f

experience. And since the conclusions ·o f science seem so often
to reflect the world view of the times, one might suspect that
scientific method is governed by, not pure reason or experience,
but by social, political and psychoiogical structures. The
argument is we don't just think objectively, in a straight line; our
thought isn't so much governed by what, say, some particles are
doing, as by the structures in our own minds and how we're
arranging our experience. Suppose a physicist's conclusions are
merely the outcome of his ·discipline's peculiar assumption$;
what implications would · this have? How does a scientist
counter this?

our experiences-like the religious. But couldn't these
psychologists turn around and tell the physicists that ."their"
results aren't in keeping with experience either? I mean, in
quantum mechanical physics, macroscopically you're still just
looking at dials.and so on, not at the atoms themselves.You say
that these quantum phenomena are part of experience; and
nature is telling us this is the way things are, but other people
could say, "you're just looking at dials. That's not really the way
it behaves; that's an artificial experience. It doesn't have as
much weight as, say, looking out the window and seeing a kid
on a red bicycle drive by."

Does experience include the feelings you get when you read certain literature? when you weep or laugh? And to deny that those
items of experience have any standing because they're somehow
not quantifiable or not scientific is to confuse the fundamental
assumption of scientific methodology with its trappings:
measurement, mathematics, quantification; and those qualities.
If people take scientific methodology and produce a descrip.:.
tion of human behavior, for instance, which is fundamentally
mechanistic, and strikes us as not true to our everyday
experience, why then I think that's a good example of not using
the scientific method, because the scientific rriethod is supposed
to produce something that is in agreement with experience. It
works in the sciences because the problems you put it on are sufficiently simple. If the problem were intrinsically complicated,
that method would either not be used or it would be. used
wrongly.
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Van Baak: But the redness of the bicycle is a quantum
phenomenon. It really is.
Ratzsch: So is the kid not falling through the bicycle.
Van Baak: That's right.
Ratzsch: So is the fact these lights are on.
Baker: When you say something is a quantum phenomenon,
what are you saying?
Van Baak:That is to say: the fact that a fluorescent light is shining is not describable by classical mechanics but by a quantum
mechanics of atoms-excited mercury atoms in this caseinside the fluorescent light.
Van Till: In other words, if Newton had been right, we would be
sitting here in the dark. But still, you have not immediately
experienced those mercury atoms. How do you know your
interpretation isn't just a reflection of your cultural paradigms?
Van Baak: Because, if that's true, then that strikes me as an
amazingly cynical thing to say about the place of natural revelation. But it's an interesting question of hermenuetics. How are
you going to "interpret" natural revelation? Theology decides
internally how special revelation is to be interpreted. I wonder, ·
is it fair that science decides internally how natural revelation is
to be interpreted, or does theology have to tell it, so to speak?
Baker: Yes. Does grace perfect nature? Or is nature
autonomous? And then the question comes up of the relationship between the church and science. What's the church saying
about that? What's the scientific community saying? The
scientific community is certainly not saying "we believe that we
may know," but I'm not sure the church is saying that anymore
either. Should the church still dictate to the scientist what are
the proper cosmologies and the proper objects of study, or not?
Van Baak: Well, to say that one cannot approach some
questions in a scientific way is to arrogate the spiritual side of ·
things, which, in effect, denies the existence of natural revelation.
.
Leegwater: Science •properly exercised is also a gift given to
mankind.
Van Baak:That's right. And I think one has to take absolutely
seriously the results of science because they are patural revelation.
Leegwater: Well, I wouldn't equate the results of science with
natural revelation, but one is able to do science because of the
revelational character of the reality we live in.
Van Baak: Somehow one is pursuing a form of revelation when
one pursues scientific knowledge. To deny that is to lead .
eventually to the perfectly cynical view that one is just acting out
one's cultural presuppositions. Because reality is a form of
revelation, I think it has some intrinsic tru(h to it; that makes it
more than just cultural determinants.
·
Van Till: And so finally you just assert that objective truth.
Van Baak: Well, right. I take that on faith. Or as a gift from
theology, if you will. If theology is so generous as to admit the
existence of natural revelation.
Daughter]
Van Till: What about the old notion of the rational fit of man to
the universe? Now the contemporary idea in physics that
particles can behave both like particles and waves, and notions
like that, defy any sort of common sense experience. What do
you think that rift between science and experience has done, if
anything, to our view of man's relation to the universe?
Van Baak: That's interesting because I find in an everyday sense
that quantum mechanics is easy to understand. The real
problem is in English, not in physics. The problem is that people
are taught when children that waves and particles are different
and mutually exclusive things.
Ratzsch: (My mother never said anything like that.)
Van Baak: But I think fundamentally-well, I shouldn't say
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','fundamentally." I don't know anything about fundamentals;
I'm just a physicist-I think that really, it's not that complicated. It's just that the real world, if I may use that bold phrase,
teaches us that electrons have wave properties, and particle
properties. And if we hadn't been told early on that waves and
particles were different things, we would say, "Yes, well."
Baker: Well, surely though the English language is as it is because that's what comports with experience.
Van Baak: Ah, but that's the problem: your experience and the
full experience, so to speak, are different matters. I agree, in
everyday tabletop experience, waves and particles are different
things , but that just means the experience is incomplete.
Baker: But that's why it's difficult, because the everyday
experience breaks down. And what Steve's talking about is that,
in the relationship between man and the universe, we expect the
table to remain solid/or us and it hasn't done so. It has decided
to become something that down deep may even be a wave of
energy, rather than an actual something I can knock my
knuckles on.
Leegwater: If it were a quantum mechanical entity your cup
could fall through it, so to speak?
Baker: That's the anxiety.
Van Baak: But that lesson has been learned before. A century
earlier, the idea of matter as something real was all of a sudden
turned into the idea of matter as mostly space and just atoms,
fundamentally indivisible rather than continuous. I think
you're right that once you learn a new level of physics, your
everyday experience is shaken a bit, but I don't think that's so
different from the culture shock you get when you travel to a
new country. I mean, when you're ina new domain of the world,
you expect new ideas to apply.
Leegwater: I think it's also true that our everyday experience is
conditioned by the classical Newtonian mechanics we've been
taught. I wouldn't fault everyday experience so much as, perhaps, the cultural way in which science has been presented to
us.
Ratzsch: But everyday experience counts as at least part of it.
One standard idea of explanation is that it's just redescription in terms of, or reduction to, the familiar. And we simply
aren't familiar with quantum mechanics. We simply don't
experience quantum type behavior.
Leegwater: Well, we do. Liquid helium crawls out of the ...
Van Baak: That's true, there are some ....
Leegwater: There are some macroscopic quantum manifestations.
Ratzsch: Yeah, right. But that's not your standard sort of experience.
Van Baak: It's a pity in a way.
Ratzsch: You don't find that in your freezer at home, right?
Van Baak: It is a pity. If people did, all these philosophical
questions would be revealed as cultural shocks; once they're
past, things seem quite natural.
Ratzsch: Well, perhaps. But there's a whole raft of competent
physicists who claim that quantum mechanics is fundamentally
incomprehensible. People like Feynman; I mean, not just the
people who can't make it.
Van Baak: Yeah, I know. Sometimes I wonder if he's not just
being literary.
·
Leegwater: He wants to sell his books, you know.
Ratzsch: Well that's always the move: If he disagrees with me,
he's not being a physicist any longer.
Van Bask:Yeah, and you hate to say that about Feynman. No, I
suppose there's a sense in which that's true. It's a domain of experience that, so to speak, we don't live in; we can only be
tourists.
•
Van Harn: I think the interesting thing is that the Newtonian

mechanical picture has had such long staying power despite
anomolies to the contrary. And that's where Kuhn's idea of the
paradigm has a hold of something. It's not just an organized
way of looking at things. It's also a reflection of the staying
power of the theory, that you can manipulate it, work on it from
various angles - and. the whole thing doesn't collapse
, immediately. At least in the history of science, people are
becoming more and more aware of these so-called social factors
and other factors; The difficulty is in weighing these different
factors.
·
Van Baak: That's true of history in gene'ral, right?

Dave Van Baak
Leegwater: Yes, it is. But I think that scientists have been very

ahistorical for too long. And that's why Kuhn's criticism fits. _
It's very attractive in the short run, when it compares large
periods-let's say Newton vis a vis Einstein-but when he starts
to make it explicit and talks about little social groups, like
groups of ten to twenty investigators in some sub-discipline of
biology, it gets very difficult to know or realize what he means
by revolution. And I think there's a bit of circularity in his argument. The paradigm defines the scientific community, and in
turn the scientific community defines the paradigm. You never
know where to pick up the sticks-how do you define the
scientific community? He thinks he has a very objective way of
doing that by- looking at literary cross-references and that sort
of work. But I think that begs the question.
·
Baker: That circularity is what brings it to that radical point
where you say it's all in our own heads, right? That's why that
happens. Then is your countermove just to say that, however we
may be looking at a thing, there is that "it" we are looking at?
Just .assert the reality of the thing you are studying?
Van Baak: Yes, that's a faith commitment that you have to
make. But all se>_rts of people ·with all sorts of ,philosophical
presuppositions are willing to make that commitment.
Leegwater: They're made on different bases. I mean, the idea
that there is some regularity to reality or to nature underlies any
good physicist's or scientist's work-if we don't believe that, it
wouldn't. make mµch sense to begin.
Ratzsch: And ·eventuaily nature does hit you in the face. The

classic case ·is the European biologist who insisted on first
reports that it was utterly impossible for a platypus to exist, and
somebody finally sent him one. And then there the thing is,
sitting on the desk, and what do you do? It's got a bill; it's -got
webbed feet; it's got fur ....
Baker: So you kill it and bury it in the back yard ....
It might be worthwhile asking, as long we've brought up
Kuhn, whether anyone hears the rumblings of a paradigm shift
in any contemporary science. Are we in the middle of any
scientific revolutions?
·
Van Baak: If there is one coming, it's in the behavioral sciences.
Skinner is the apostle of an attempted coup d'etat. It's not
clear what the future of that idea is. But, that's the field I see it
coming in, in the next ~ecade or two.
Leegwater: It took a while to come in classical physics. It took
two hundred years. So, even physics is not without its possible
changes.
Van Baak: That's right. But we had our revolution so recently, I
would be surprised to see another one. Some physicists find it
disconcerting that the fiftieth anniversary of the American
Institute of Physics just happened this year. The l 920's and
1930's were the big years in physics. And physicists ask
themselves, "Why aren't we making progress like the greats, like
the giants of the earth in those days?" You can't always have
revolutions. In physics the consequences are still reverberating.
I would be surprised if another happened.
Van Harn: In biology, or more precisely, physiology, I w'ould
most likely · foresee a revolution, or new paradigms and
organizing themes, in neurology.
Leegwater: It's hard to say in chemistry. But we are taking
quantum mechanics more seriously all the time. It's encouraging to me to see how the disciplines of chemistry and physics are
becoming more or less one.
·
Baker: To change the subject a bit, I'd like to pursue the relationship between science and culture, especially Western
culture. In the third world countries I've lived in, western
science and culture are talismans of power. The people who
make it with that power are the westernized people. Those who
· maintain their own culture can't use it so well. So technology
ends up as a sort of missionary of Western culture; only insofar
as people accept Western values, can they use our technology.
Science brings the good and the bad in our culture to these
people. So, the question seems to be: can what we call "science"
be done outside of, or apart from, our cultural framework? And
should it? Is there such a thing as non-Western science?
Ratzscb: Well, I'm n,ot sure exactly what you mean by Western
or non-Western science. Years ago, I read a kind of interesting
science fiction story in which some alien culture had developed
something that looked very much like science, except it had a
completely different ontology. They could explain radio broadcasting, but the explanations were that the surrounding ether
was filled with angels, and when you touched this key, it would
call the angels and they would travel at a certain speed and line
up, _and-depending on how closely the angels were packed and
depending on · their wing height-you would get different
sounds coming out of the radio. Now, is that Western science?
Baker: Well, in essence, I would say yes. I would suspect that the
methods are the same.
. Ratzsch: Alright, so then what's non-Western science? I'm not
·sure what the question comes to yet.
Van Baak.: Well, I could easily believe something was nonWestern science if it didn't have an idea of cause and effect 1 for
instance.
Ratzsch: So Liebniz was not a Western scientist?
Van Baak: Well, I couldn't say from personal experience.
Baker: It's not so much what an individual believes, but the
ways of thinking, the categories that are in the air of a culture
1
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and that he us.es to structure his own thought. Can science be
done apart from our culture's priorities and categories? We do
science because we value certain things and think certain ways.
Without our Western values, would we even want to do science?
Ratzsch:Well, that sounds more as though ·you're asking if any
of these other societies have any motive or motivation for doing
something that resembles science, not "iftheyweredoingsomething, would the results be science."
Van Bau: The fact that science started in P -rotestant, Northwestern Europe is, I think, somehow not accidental. It is
connected to the culture.
Baker: Of course, the tendency there is to say, "If we've· got
something nobody else has, then we must be superior." And we
do undeniably have this power: we can make guns.
Van Till:The undeniable fact that science gives us this power
forces us to consider the question of the ethics of science.
Genetic engineering, for example: there the potential for great
good and great harm has provoked vehement discussion of
whether we can "play God." How should that be resolved?
Van Harn:"Can we play God?" That's something we do all the
time. The whole notion of man being in the image of God says
that he is God's representative. In that sense that's our mandate:
we're representing God . So I don't think it's a question of
whether or not we should; I think it's a question of what direction should the genetic engineering go~ or any sort of scientific
work. Genetic engineering isn't particularly unique. I think the
scientific community, the biological community, is very immersed in trying to decide to what extent it should be done.
There's genuine disagreement. Some are very much opposed to
some of the directions that genetic engineering is going.
Sinsheimer argues that we shouldn't be involved in it unless we
know in what direction it's going, how we can control it, and he
particularly objects to certain areas that may have extreme
social consequences. He's really saying, "You've got to ask what
are the social consequences before you begin to do some of the
work." He was an opponent of the DNA recombination work
because he didn't know what the consequences would be. But
on the other hand, there are people all over the world who are
very much in favor of it.
Leegwater: I think there is something healthy to the Asilomar
conference that was held. I know it was a false alarm in a sense,
but I found it very encouraging that people were willing to step
back and ask, "Now should we be doing this type of experiment?"
Baker: What conference was that?
Van Baak: Before the general world woke up to the fact that
new techniques in genetic engineering were going to be
available, the biologists themselves organized a conference to
ask what sort of techniques would be possible and whether they
should put any restraints on themselves collectively. And they
came up with a declaration which was self-policing for a
number of years.
Van Harn: And they also had a moratorium on work until the
guidelines were set up for control and regulation.
Van Till: The problem, of course, is that there's no way of
knowing ahead of time whether your discoveries will be used for
good or bad.
Leegwater:That's very, very difficult. With the hydrogen bomb,
I think, or genetic engineering, it might be a little easier, but
there are many cases where one simply can't oversee.
Baker: Is that something the scientist should do, or has to do:
that is, should he think about how other people are going to use
what he comes up with? Can't the scientist simply say, "There's
that objective empirical reality out there; I'm going to tell you
what it's like and what it can do, and what you do with that is up
to you?"

24

Van Harn:Well surely, in the scientific community there is that
group that thinks objective kn·owledge is the highest value and
that all we have to do is pursue the facts and leave the use of that
information to others, but I think that isn't the trend within the
scientific community.
Leegwater: I think we shouldn't dismiss .the fact that most
science is done in a kind of industrial/ technological complex.
Once something has been discovered, supposedly by pure
science, quite often it gets translated very quickly into something that's marketable.
Van Harn:There isn't very much science that is done simply to
satisfy curiosities about the natural world.
Van Baak: That's always been true.
Baker: So, how does science go forward? From people with
money asking for certain things? Or what happens?
Van Baak: Well, I think the curiosity of the investigato~s does
push them forward in the sense that at the given stage of their
work they're curious to find out what would happen if they tried
the next thing. It's a much more difficult question to decide how
much of it is their own curiosity and how much is the direction
of the people paying for the research.
Van Harn:There's very heavy influence by the federal government as to which sort of research they are going to fund. Do
they fund basic research, or are they going to do work which is
directed toward some immediate goal? You're going to find a lot
of people who direct their research so that it can be supported
by the federal government.
Van Baak:I think the government is infinitely pragmatic. It has
almost no curiosity, so to speak (by which I mean us. I mean,
that's how we spend our money, right?). And it devotes a billion
dollars a year to the National Science Foundation to see what
will come of it, to see if the nation can be improved as a result.
Leegwater: That is, if the money is put in, at least something
should come out.
Van Baak: That's right. It's hard to believe when you listen to
congressional hearings on space money or National Science
Foundation money that the aesthetic appeal or the curiosity has
anything to do with it at all. You see scientists bend over backwards to make a popular social justification for research that
you know and they know they're pursuing for fundamental
reasons of curiosity and aesthetic appeal.
Leegwater: Well, it even happens in philosophy if I'm not mistaken. Philosophy of medicine is booming right now, and that's
primarily because that's what's being federally supported. But
it's true that the government is very interested in projects these
days of science and human values, engineering and human
values, technological assessment.
Van Till: Why do you think that interest has come up lately?
Van Baak: Well, the consequences of ignoring that facet of
reality have become all too clear. It's not clear to me that the
supposed fix is going to fix anything, but it's being tried and in a
pragmatic way: "Well, look what happens when we neglect
these things; let's try to do these things, and see if that'll help."
That's all.
Van Till:I'd like to examine the question of science and religion
more closely. These two institutions have been interacting in .
Western culture for thousands of years: how are they relating
these days? Have scientists become religious again .... ?
Leegwater: They've always been religious. That is the very
nature of human experience-just to be religious. So there has
always been "interaction" between science and religion. We
tend to play it down, I think, because sometimes it's very
difficult to see how our scientific work and results reflect
religious direction in life. But I don't see it as much as saying,
"Here are two areas: how do they interact?" I would rather start
from a point of integrality.
_Van Till·Okay, we start with this ma_n who's basically religious,

but there's still conflict and antagonism. For instance, there's a
know.
group who thinks, "Well, if this world is run by a God who's
Van Harn: In general, you find outsiders trying to use some of
sovereign and essentially rational, then there must be some sort
those ideas and suffering the consequences of that.
of determinism or predict!lbility to nature! But people have disVan Baak: The atmosphere generated by the claims of the
covered the uncertainty principle, and they say "we can't know
particular scientific discovery always includes that pushing of
certain things, and that shouldn't be the case with a God who is
things too far.
essentially rational." So, you've got two groups which exhibit a
The problem, of course, is that the obvious temptation is to
conscious antagonism. So even if there is an integrality to man,
conclude that all there is can be learned by physical methods.
you still have this opposition between the practicing members in
Then you have non-Christian science. I think I can say that the
each group.
fundamental lesson that physicists learned in the twentieth
Baker: I think that if you want to focus this question, what you
century was humility. That's a very welcome change from late
have to think about are institutions, or people as they represent
nineteenth century times when physicists displayed on occasion
institutions: the institution of the church vs. the institution of
a certain arrogance: physics was certainly going to explain
science, or in cooperation with it.
everything there was, and the supposition that anything in the
Leegwater: I don't want to neglect that discussion. The World
material world could be unexplainable was just fundamentally
Council of Churches is saying, for example, "We're concerned
_untenable. Since 1930, I think it's been dear that some things
about science. As an ecclesiastical institution, we'd like to invite
are unobservable physically. The lesson that's been learned, in
you scientists in. We can learn from you, and perhaps you can
general, is that those things are outside the province of physics;
learn from us."
That's not aways carried over into what ·you might call a
Van Harn: The Free University last fall convened a conference
theological application, but it certainly influences the develop- ,
which was modeled after the World Council Conference
ment of quantum physics. You start right away writing down
primarily concerned with science. So there is at least more conwhat you call "observables," and the rest you consciously leave
versation between the institution of science and the instit'ution
out.
of the church than there was half a dozen or ten years ago.
Leegwater: Some physicists haven't learned that humility yet,
Baker: .Still, there's always that underlying feeling in many
supposedly. The hidden variabilists, for example, are still
people's minds: that science has made religion untenable, has
pegging away at trying to find something objective that's there.
"proven" that the real th'ings are the empirical things and if
Van Baak: Well the original, the simplest form of so-called
anyone tries to explain the universe spiritually it's just laughable
hidden variable theory is probably not tenable, but you can
in the face of science, right? That's a popular notion. You run
construct forms of such theories that are deterministic at base
into it over and over again.
and still testable. I think the case is still open, although I'd be
Van Baak: Somehow it has always struck me as·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a measure of the adolescence of a scientific
discipline that it ·makes those claims. Physics
made those claims about the picture of the Newtonian world machine. When Napoleon asked
Laplace whether he needed God in his book on
astronomy, he replied, "Sir, I have no need of
that hypothesis." Then, nineteenth century
biology made the claim that evolution explains
away God. Perhaps, in the twentieth century,
the adolescent science is behaviorism. It's striking to find that sciences outgrow that stage; I
think that twentieth century physics has gotten
past it. Very few phycisists any more will argue
that physics explains away the need for God.
· They may use biology or the sociology of religion to explain away .the need for God, but .
. rarely is the matter decided on physical
questions any more. I would be surprised if the
other sciences didn't also get beyond that stage
because as a Christian I find the altern_ative impossible to contemplate. That a science could,
by its own methodology consistently applied, ..__ _ _ _
Del Ratzsch
prove the nonexistence of God would, of course, to me as a
surprised
if
a
hidden
variable
theory
ever
turned
out
to be true.
scientist, carry some weight. And since I don't believe in the
Baker: May a layperson ask what the hidden variable theory
possibility of the consequence, I'm forced to admit the impossimight be?
bility of the premise.
Van Baak: Yes. That is the claim that below the apparent inde- .
Ratzsch: There's the view, though, that we've finally got someterminacy of quantum behavior there is an unknowable but
thing that's going to allow us to explain absolutely everything.
nevertheless determined level of behavior. It's not clear what the
Is that something that's functionally intrinsic to the early stages
aesthetic attraction ·of a hidden variable theory is; it's lik.e that
of any science?
philosopher's whipping boy, the invisible gardener. If life is
Van Baak: Ifs important. It's crucial. From the point of view of
determined at base but the agency of determination is
scientific methodology, it's essential that you push the
unknowable in principle, it's not clear what you've bought.
hypothesis as far as it will go and,..J_eam what its limitations are.
Ratzsch: There's a mathematical result that has come out,
• It's scientifically treasonable not do do thilt. And, of course; in
perhaps ten or twelve years ago, called the Bell inequality,
the process you always get grandiose claims which subsequently
which turns out to have some experimental consequences
will be shown to be excessive. But until you try it gut, you don't
..ii,
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concerning whether or not hidden variable theories of certain
sorts are viable. The experimental thrust , as much as I can make
out, seems to be fo r indete rminism , but it's by no means a settled
question.
Baker: It's curious tha t in talking about the aesthetic attraction
of this, you should bring up the invisible ga rdener who is him-: ·
self an· analogy of God. Maybe that's the aesthetic attraction:
while we're looking for an Invisible Gardener, somebody else is
looking for a Hidd en Varia ble. Would you say that the
motivation behind all this is to find some kind of foundation, to
try to banish the indeterminacy , relativity and what have you?
Van Baak: Yeah , I'd say that some people find a philosophical
attraction in having a wo rld which is deterministic at base, and
some people, Einstein among them, find it ve ry unappealing to
have a world which is fundamen tally probablistic and indeterminate, uncertain in those senses.
Van Till: Has that unsettled a lot of people, do you think , that
indeterminacy?
Van Baak: No, I think in every generation, only a very few are
ever troubled by the philosophical presuppositions of a
scientific discipline. Most of them are competent workers who
are content to work in their own sphere, and I think that's in
some sense right.
Ratzsch: But the people who have objected to indeterminism,
the hidden va ria ble theorists, have not traditionally beeri
slouches. I mea n, they're Einstein and Schroedinger and Bohm
and ....
Van Baak: That's right. I mean they're clearly good people, but
it's just that it's too hard a question to bring into the everyday
doing of the discipline .
Ratzsch: I think what it comes down to is that some people
think that indeterminacy doesn't allow for adequate explanation , that there's something essentially just incomprehensible
about fundamentally uncaused events. What's being sought are
explanations that are complete in some sense . You just can't
have them if you settle for indeterminacy. There's Einstein's
famous quote, of course.
Van Baak: Yes , "God does not play dice ."
Leegwater: You think that Steve Weinberg is doing this with
his attempted unity of various forces? Is it simply out of
intellectual curiosity? Perhaps, but I doubt it, I think ....
Van Baak: No , he has another ax to grind. He wants the
scientific description to apply throughout, to cover the whole
scope of the universe: from the fundamental particles to the
whole cosmos and from the big bang to the infinite future. It's
just not palatable to that· sort of person to have some theories
that only apply here and now, and other theories that apply
there and then. And I agree, there's some sort of unity ....
Leegwater: Although he does admit in the latter part of his
book, The First Three M inutes, the more comprehensible it
seems to be, the more meaningless it is. I'm not sure that I have
the quote accurately ...
Baker: But that's not just a single individual's impulse, it seems
to me. That's one of the underlying rules of all scientific investigation: to look for the most elegant, the simplest, the most allencompassing solution.
Leegwater: Well , and if truth is simple it has to be one.
Van Baak: That there can only be one truth and that .it has to
apply universally is, I think , as much a scientific presupposition as religious. That is to say all those ways of looking at
reality seem to share that presupposition.
Ratzsch: What about all these claims that people like Cap and
Zukov and , to some extent, Torrance, are making about our
contemporary physics ultimately heading in exactly the direction where Buddhism has always been.
Leegwater : You mean the Tao of Physics. ·
Ratisch: Yeah, that and The Dancing Wu Li M asters by Zukov,
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and so forth. If. as was intimated earlier. these Eastern holistic
-ways of thinking are fundamentally opposed to the Western
scientific method, why is it the case, if it is the case-and I guess
that's the question-that contemporary particle physics in
particular is heading in exactly that direction? I mean, isn't it
heading toward holism? You've got these beta functions that
give you a value for every point in space and they interfere and
do all kinds of nifty things and if you get the right equation, one
equation, you're going to be able to deduce absolutely everything-according to some scientists at least.
Baker: On the same line, haven't some asserted that the basic
claims of mysticism and frontier physics are becoming rapidly
indistinguishable?
·van Baak: Those statements always strike me as fashionable
and almost cocktail party conversation, and, at base, void in
some deep sense. It just strikes me as an imperfect understanding of either how physics is done or how mysticism is done. If
that's all true, then you would expect a parallel development in
what we're calling the non-Western cultures where they would
have started with the holistic view, made a whole bunch of
holistic discoveries , and would have then progressed in their
turn toward the more particular.
Ratzsch: And why would you think that?
Van Baak: Well, it's just .. .I mean, logic is symmetrical; why
shouldn't it work on both sides?
Baker: Yes, but when you start with a holistic view, you don't
work down; you stop.
Van Baak: But that has no more persuasive power than the
claim that when you start with a particular view you don't work
up to the holistic. Besides, I'm not sure that the thrust of particle
physics is anything toward the holistic unity that people see in
mysticism or Buddhism or anything like that. It strikes me that
fundamentally it's just exactly an enlargement of the scope of
the domain in which particularistic methods work to include the
whole domain of the physical universe.
Leegwater: But hasn't there also traditionally been that movement in physics-Einstein for example-to try to establish
some unity? There's a whole plethora of physical phenomena,
and there's almost an underlying wish and a hope that there is
some unity there.
Van Baak: It's a thirst of economy of description. Now it's not
clear to me that that is so specifically a Western idea.
Leegwater: This idea that it has to be a simple physical explanation or that it has to be on a maximum level of objectivity. That,
I think is ... .
Van Baak: Well, the objectivity I'm sure is part of it, but I don't
know. Is it shared in other schemes of thought than scientific
that the fundamental truth has to be simple? I'm not sure. I
mean, would we say that about religious belief or mystical truth
or something like that?
Baker: In general, yes.
Van Baak: That seems to be some sort of, I don't know, innate
human thirst. I'm not sure.
Baker: That's why you can't say the East ought to evince a symmetrical movement from holism to particularity, because if the
Oriental thought systems are already holistic, they're not going
to say "we need some more particularism;" they're going to rest
in the simple unity they have achieved.
Ratzsch: Of course the ultimate simplicity-and this is a theory
I have actually heard expounded-is that there is precisely one
particle in the universe which just keeps buzzing around back
and forth and all of us are composed of it.
[laughter]

Pink Sofas

Mark Mul~er
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Floating World
· Leonard Sweetman
Ichiryusai Hiroshige, 1797-1858, is· one of the best-known
Japanese artists in the medium of wood-block prints. Of the
5,400 wood-block prints which Hiroshige produced during his
life, the series called The Fifty-Three Stations of the Takaido
proved to be the most popular and the most enduring of his
works. During his career, he produced, according to some
estimates, more than forty different series of the prints bearing
that title, and extant prints of some of the stations indicate that,
in later editions of the prints, Hiroshige used scenes significantly different from the original versions of Jhe series_.
Why did Hiroshige's prints become·"best sellers" in Japan?
Why did his work appeal to the "masses," the common people?
From 1600 until 1867, the Tokugawa Shogunate, something
like a military dictatorship, ruled Japan. The Tokugawa
Shogunate replaced the artistocratic hierarchy which had
governed on behalf of the emperor of Japan. With the
emergence of the Tokugawa Shogunate, a new caste or class of
people began to assume importance in the Japanese economy:
the non-titled, the non-nobility, the commoners. And art
shifted its focus in the new society where businessmen were the
new "aristocrats." Ihara Saikaku began to use plebeian heroines
and businessmen heroes in his novels. His novels provided the
new "aristocrats" with a chronicle of their experiences
paralleling the content of pre-Tokugawa literature which had
. told tales of the nobility and the imperial court.

Hiroshige, a commoner and artist, lived in the last half
century of this new society. He was born and raised in Edo,
(Tokyo), the headquarters of the Tokugawa Shogunate. His
father died when Hiroshige was thirteen, and the boy succeeded
to · his father's position as minor official in the fire brigade.
Hiroshige's interest, however, was painting, not fires. When he
was twenty-six, he turned over his role in the fire brigade to
someone else. He then devoted himself to painting, and ultimately, to the entire process of making wood-block prints.
In 1832, Hiroshige was invited to accompany a military
escort for several horses which the Shogun was presenting to the
emperor in celebration of the rice harvest. Hiroshige was to ·
make sketches and paintings of this journey. The group
followed the route of the Tokaido: i.e., "the road facing the
eastern ocean." The route began at Nihonbashi, in Edo, and
ended in the imperial capital, Kyoto. At fifty-three places a
day's journey apart along the route, travelers could stop to rest,
to refresh themselves, and to sleep.
In 1834 Hiroshige produced the results of his trip to Kyoto: a
series of wood-block prints entitled The Fifty-Three Stations of
the Tokaido. In addition to representing each -station with a
print, Hiroshige also produced a print of the place from which
the trip began, Nihonbashi, and the place at which the trip
ended, Kyoto: altogether fifty-five prints.
These prints are classified as Ukiyo-e, "pictures of the
floating world." The term ukiyo-e describes the temporal world

Station #16, Kambara

28

of the -commoners in Edo, the Tokugawa capital. Ukiyo-e
originally were paintings commoners produced for the enjoyment of other commoners. But they were not produced for the
masses. They were intended only for the houses of rich
commoners, the new "aristocrats." In the seventeenth century,
however, the Japanese developed the process of wood-block
printing. As a resylt, artists could produce a fairly large volume
of very impressive pictures, and this accessible wood-block

print attracted the masses. The new art form acquainted them
graphically with the manners, customs and attractive features .
of geographical districts other than their own. (Cf. Ichitaro
Kondo, ed., Hiroshige's Fifty-Three Stages of the Tokaido, p.3).
Of course, one should not think that Hiroshige functioned
merely to provide the common people of Edo with a visual
chronicle of places· along the Tokaido whose reputation for
beauty or for special foods was known throughout the country.
Hiroshige was an artist. He did not simply reproduce "nature"
as he found it. Rather, he manipulated the materials he saw for
his own purposes. Stat~on #16, Kambara, is an excellent'illustration of Hiroshige's artistic character. Although he travelled
to Kyoto during the early summer, the representation of
Kambara is a winter scene. Two observations can be made
about this. First, it rarely snows in Kambara. Second, no scene
around Kambara can be identified as the locale of Hiroshige's
print. The print is of an imaginary scene, one which is
acknowledged as among the greatest wood-block prints _ever
made in Japan.
The print which represents Station #46, Shono, is considered
the second wood-block print in this series that deserves to be
called a "masterpiece." What catches one's attention is the
superb technique Hiroshige has used to make a violent rainstorm vivid and real-reminiscent of a typhoon. One feels the
discomfort of the travelers bending into the wind, their backs
blasted by driven sheets of rl;!in. Hiroshige used slanting lines to
picture rain-a technique which Europeans admired and one
. which effectively transports the viewer into the midst of the

typhoon. The entire scene, again, is a creation of Hiroshige's
imagination. The vicinity of Shono harbors no scen·e
reminiscent of this print.
In the first two prints mentioned, the artist's techniques and
his creative use of the landscape were highlighted. The print of
Station #36, Gozu (see overle~f) is one in which Hiroshige's
concern for the common people comes to visible and vibrant expression. Several female employees of an inn are forcibly en tic-

ing a few travelers to stay at their inn. The scene has a comic
aura. One traveler is being choked; his face reddens as he struggles to free himself from the hotel employee. It is a very human
situation in which all the actors are recognizable people in reallife situations.
One should note too the signs located in the entry of the inn.
From right to left, they read: (1.) "Continuation of the Tokaido
pictures," (2.) "Jirobei, Engraver," (3.) "Heibei, Printer," and
(4.) "lchiryusai" (i.e., Hiroshige). In many wood-block prints,
one finds devices in the design which identify the publisher.
Prints, moreover, are signed by the artist. The printer and the
engraver, however, are not identified; these two occupations are
regarded as some of the most lowly among artisans. That
Hiroshige here identifies these men reflects his concern for the
common man. This former fire brigade official remembers the
importance of the ordinary person and his contribution to
society. Hiroshige pays tribute to the lowly craftsmen whose
work has contributed to the . making of these prints which
delighted the masses in Tokugawa society.
Now here does Hiroshige exhibit his concern for the common
people more than in the print identified as Station #54, Otsu.
Otsu is located on the shores of Lake Biwa, the largest lake in
iapan. This city is the location, furthermore, of many wellknown Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines which ·attracted
many travelers and pilgrims.
How does Hiroshige represent Otsu? By a shrine? By a scene
in which the beautiful shoreline of Lake Biwa blends into the
grounds of a temple or of the city, itself? Hiroshige, in the
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original edition and in several subsequent editions of The Fifty-Three Stations of the Tokaido, represented Otsu in a scene
which focuses on heavy wagons containing bags of rice and
packaged charcoal. Lumbering oxen led by draymen pull the
wagons, Hiroshige, the artist of the people, portrays a scene in
which the common people of Edo can see the customs and
manners of an area different from their own.

Hiroshige earned the reputation which still is his. In the new
society which was created by the Tokugawa Shogunate, the
common people gained a new importance. Hiroshige the artist,
from commoner stock, made available to these commoners art
in an inexpensive form in which the artist celebrated the beauty
of Japan's landscape and the character and the beauty of
Japan's common people.

Station #54, Otsu
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Snow tires
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